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IV. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j) provides the Utah Supreme 
Court jurisdiction to decide this appeal. 
V. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Does the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, when 
applied to shield local government and its employee from liability 
for fraud and negligence, violate Utah Const, art. I, § 11? 
2. Is the negligent inspection of a building a core 
governmental function? 
3. Does Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 or § 63-30-10.5 waive 
any possible statutory immunity granted to Salt Lake County and/or 
its building official for the negligent inspection and enforcement 
of the building code and/or for the negligent issuance of a 
temporary certificate of occupancy? 
4. Are issuing a temporary certificate of occupancy 
and/or enforcing the building code ministerial acts not protected 
by Utah's governmental immunity statute? 
5. Are there factual issues precluding summary judgment 
on claims for fraud? 
1 
6. Did the county and/or its buildincf official violate 
appellants' constitutional rights guaranteed by the 1st, 5th and 
14th Amendments to the United States Constitution? 
The standard of review for each issue follows: 
All issues raised from the appeal of an adverse summary 
judgment are issues of law with no deference to the trial court. 
Feree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1989)- Further, on appeal, 
the party against whom the judgment has been granted is entitled to 
have all the facts presented and all inferences arising therefrom 
considered in a light most favorable to him. e.g., Whitman v. W.T. 
Grant Co., 395 P.2d 918 (Utah 1964). 
In addition, because the DeBrvs allege that their 1st 
Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances has been 
abridged by the County and its employee, any actions that may have 
had an effect of curtailing the DeBrys1 exercise of their 1st 
Amendment rights must be closely scrutinized. Eilers v. Palmer, 
575 F.Supp. 1259 (D. Minn. 1984). 
VI. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules and regulations are determinative of issues 
presented herein. They are reproduced as part of the appendix to 
Appellants % E>rief. 
2 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const, amend. I 
U.S. Const, amend. V 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV 
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-15 
Ordinances 
Salt Lake County Ordinance Chapter 15 (previously Title II, 
Chapter I; adopting the Uniform Building Code) 
Uniform Building Code Sections 303(e), 303(b), 305, 307 
VII. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment 
to Salt Lake County and its building official Wallace R. Noble. 
The case involves multiple parties. The lower court, pursuant to 
U.R.C.P. Rule 54(b), certified this case for appeal. 
VIII. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 56 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, is improperly granted if there is any 
genuine issue of material fact. e.g., Young v. Felornia, 121 Utah 
3 
646, 244 P.2d 862 (1952); Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342 (Utah 
1978), When the trial court does grant a motion for summary 
judgment, the appellate court views the facts in the light most 
favorable to the losing party and gives no deference to the trial 
court's conclusions which are reviewed for correctness, e.g., Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989); Barber v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 751 P.2d 248 (Utah App. 1988). Using 
the foregoing criteria, the following facts are relevant to the 
issues presented for review. 
1. The appellants Robert J. DeBry and Joan DeBry ("the 
DeBrys11) are the purchasers of a newly constructed office building 
located at 4252 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 563-576; 
affidavit of Robert J. DeBry dated 4/10/86 at para. 1.) 
2. The building was purchased from Del Bartel and Dale 
Thurgood dba Cascade Enterprises ("Cascade"). Cascade constructed 
the building,, (R. 563-76, 4217-4220; affidavits of Robert J. DeBry 
dated 4/10/86 and 8/7/87.) 
3. Prior to the construction and purchase, respondent 
Salt Lake County ("County") adopted the Uniform Building Code 
("UBC"). 
4. The UBC imposes simple and direct requirements which 
must be complied with before a building can be lawfully built and 
occupied. The person responsible for enforcing the UBC is the 
4 
building official. Respondent Wallace R. Noble ("Noble") is the 
building official designated by the UBC. In addition, he was the 
county's chief building inspector and in charge of the County's 
building department. Noble was ultimately responsible for 
enforcing the UBC and all County inspectors were under his direct 
supervision and control. (Deposition of Wallace R. Noble, 3/28/86 
pp. 5-6 [hereinafter "Noble depo. pp. "]•) 
5. Pursuant to UBC Section 3 01, it is unlawful to 
construct an office building without a building permit. In 
addition, a certificate of occupancy cannot be issued to a builder 
who lacks a building permit. 
6. UBC § 202(d) prohibits construction of a building 
during a valid stop work order. No certificate of occupancy can be 
issued during a stop work order. 
7. UBC § 305 requires the building official to conduct 
a series of inspections of the building. No certificate of 
occupancy can be issued until the inspections are performed. 
8. UBC § 303 (a) (e) requires the builder to have the 
county approve his plans prior to construction. No certificate of 
occupancy can be issued until the plans are approved. 
9. UBC § 305(c) requires the builder to keep an 
inspection report card (the backside of the building permit) posted 
at the construction site. 
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10. Noble and the County have no discretion to: 
a) Ignore a stop work order; 
b) Allow construction to take place without a 
building permit or in violation of a stop work 
order; 
c) Conduct inspections without the existence of a 
valid building permit; 
d) Issue any plumbing or electrical permit prior 
to issuing a valid building permit; 
e) Issue a temporary certificate of occupancy 
prior to issuing a full building permit; 
f) Fail to enforce or follow the requirements of 
the UBC. 
(R. 3936-3941; affidavit of G. Ernest Hughes dated 
7/14/87.) 
11. Contrary to the UBC, Cascade built the buildincf 
without county approved plans. (Admission #4, Salt Lake County's 
Response to Plaintiff's First Request for Admissions [hereinafter 
"Admissions"].) 
12. Contrary to the UBC, Cascade built the building in 
violation of a valid stop work order issued by the County. (Noble 
depo. pp. 40-41; Admissions Nos. 1-2). 
6 
] 3. Contrary to the UBC, Noble and the County failed to 
c o n d u c t a 1 ] t h e i n s p e c 11 o n s s e t f o r 11 :i i i :i t h e U B C, I I o b 1 e p e r f o r m e d 
no i nspectlons, The County performed some haphazard inspections. 
T h e i n s p e c t i o n s were c o n d u c t e d d e s p i 1: e t h e .3 a c J ;: o f a p p r ::> e d p • ] a i i s 
and a building permi t, When any inspection was made, tl :i.e Coi inty 
inspectors d id not check thei r fi1es and determi ne whether the 
j ' g he :i a bi ii ] d ii i i j per mi 1: I Tor d :i :i tl le :i i ispect :>rs compare the 
consti uctioi i wi th an> approved plans , (Noble depo pp 10-17 , 34-
4 2.) 
14 . Tl le DCE Br ys c] osed : •! l t l ic= sa ] e c f tl IG bi J :i ] di i lg in 
December of 1985. A t that: time the DeBrys were unaware of the UBC 
v i o 1 a t i o n s s e t f o r t h a b o v e N e v e r t h e 3 e s s , t o a s s i i r e t h a t t h e 
buiidiny wu.:, ccjmp 1 c 1 c »uiui * .Co, i J \\ >o.c i t J c cDiitr act uu I p r e -
condition to the closing of the sale was the product ion nl a 
certificate of occupancy irom the County. (R. 2301-2303; affidavit 
ot l.obert. J , beBry) . 
15, The UBC provides for two types of certificates of 
occupancy, The bui1d inq official may issue a f i na I cert i ficat< of 
occupancy ii the bui lding is complete, all inspections have I >een 
made and the construction meets each and every requirement of the 
UBC", UBC ", MI" 'i in . P M if If.n
 ( Hu ivnijitv ,)"-] i t « building 
official may issue a temporary certificate ut occupancy only "if 
they find that no substantial hazard will result from occupancy of 
; 
the building before the same is completed. . • ." [U.B.C. § 
307(d)]. A temporary certificate of occupancy may not be issued if 
the building lacks a building permit or if there exists a County 
stop work order• 
16 • To obtain a temporary certificate of occupancy, 
Cascade met Noble at the construction site. Noble made no 
inspection of the building at that time and he had not made any 
previous inspections. (Noble depo. pp. 10-17.J Noble did not have 
his file on the building in his possession. He had not examined 
his file to determine if proper permits existed or whether the 
required inspections had been made. Noble also did not attempt to 
verify the building permit and inspection record required by law to 
be kept on the construction site. 
17. When Noble requested Cascade to show him its 
building permit, Cascade only produced the footings and foundations 
permit. Noble recognized that Cascade had only a footings and 
foundations permit but because Cascade told him it needed the 
certificate of occupancy and was pressed for time, Noble issued the 
temporary certificate of occupancy. (Noble depo. pp. 14-17.) The 
temporary certificate of occupancy recited a few minor items which 
needed to be completed prior to the issuance of a final certificate 
of occupancy. 
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18 . A t t h e t i n:i e N o b 1 e g a v e C a s c a d e t h e t e m p o r a r y 
certificate of occupancy, N :: 1::>] e knew tl le DeBrys would re] } en I the 
c e r11fi ca t e a n d purchase t h e bu11dIng a t a s ch edu 1 e d De c ember 
closing. (Noble depo pp 12-13.) 
19 , Wl len 1 lob] e r e t u r n e d t o hi s o f f i c e t h e n e x t da>
 ilf he 
c h e c k e d h i s f i 1 e a n d d i s cov e r e d t h a t C a s c a d e d i d n o t h a \ e a 
b"i i i ] d i n g p e i: in i t , I I c • w e v e r , 1 I c= in a :i € i I c a 1 1 emp t wl l a t s o e A ir e r t c • i i o t i f y 
t h e D e B r y s o f h i s in, i s t a k e i i i i s s u i n g t h e t e m p o r a r y c e r t i f i c a t e o f 
occupancy u n t i l 3 0 d ays l a t e r , (Nob] e d e p o , pp. 5 0 - 5 2 , ) 
2 0 . Th e ::: ] o s I n g c ::: ::: u r r e d • ::: i i I) e c emb e r It 3 , ] 9 8 5 , s = v e i I 
days after the temporary certificate of occupancy was i ssued. 
Cascade produced t he t emp orary c ert if icat e a t th e c1o s ing. 
21. Af !:  y s took possess:! oi l • : f tl: le 1 :>i id ] d:i i i g , 
the DeBrys discovered numerous, violations of the UBC. The DeBrys 
notified the county of the violations and defects. However, the 
county, instead of requiri ng the contractor to comply v. -.e 
code, used the violations as a pretext to evict th- DeL-rys and 
punish the DeBrys for brir-:: : " j tneir complaints to and against the 
County. 
2 2. The DeBrys sued Noble and the County for misrepre-
s e n t a t i o n
 i f r a i i d i I e g ] :i g e n c e g r o s s n e g ] i g e n c e a i i d f :: i: i o ] a t i n g 
t h e D e B r y s ' c o n s t i t u t i o i i a 1 r i g h t s (R. 3 3 6 6 - 3 4 9 9 ; S e c o i i d R e v i s e d 
Substitute Amended Complaint [hereinafter "'Complaint1
 J . , 
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Specifically, the DeBrys complaint said that the 
following representations are implicit in the issuance of the 
temporary certificate of occupancy: 
a) A valid building permit has been issued for 
construction of the building; 
b) The building has been constructed according to the 
requirements of the U.B.C. 
c) All legally required inspections have been carried 
out; 
d) There is no hazard in allowing the building to be 
occupied; 
e) The only work to be completed before issuance of a 
permanent certificate of occupancy is listed on the 
temporary certificate; 
and that the County and Noble knew, or should have known, the 
following to be true: 
a) No full building permit had been issued; 
b) A stop work order was in place and had never been 
removed; 
c) The building had not been properly inspected; 
d) The building did not meet UBC safety requirements; 
e) The building was hazardous and not safe* 
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1 ^ h i ^ < - . - . - ? - . - •
 n Teoresent^ti r.s and were 
} ' - - . . J
 H' - . . . 
.,,- i l l ego i t~ ,^ ^ . - c , ;n t - H i d .: ,' : i 
*" * '
!
 ^ ' I O C L I O I I u i r - * i i i i u i i i s a n a 
, .r . w. . *+• p a r a g r a p , .. ) 
"VEry^ a i l e a * .: t r; * a - ~*! •- s c : r c e 
t h e u u i . : . • ' ' <=*.-
damage tw * _ : L ? ^ , ; , , j . , -. ...• , . . * .-.: p a . . - .graphs 4 , * Z . ) 
Finally, the DeBrys alleged that the Courry ir\ evicting 
a i i d p u s h I n g 11 I e ii:i d e p i: i e d 11 i e in : f !:  h e :i i: c o i I s t :i • 
protected b;r the 1 s t:, 5th and 14tl :i Amendments • \ , J \>. - y i; 
Comp 1 aint at: paragraphs 5 5-61 ,) 
Noble ai id tl ie Coi u it;> mo ved f c i: summar y ju :g. 
lower cour t di d not consider whether the factual eJ'.:ent. c 
negligence, mi srepresentati on and frai id are present ±n tnis se . 
1 1' Di : rti as ; tl ME :::oi n : t: coi iceri led ; ri tl i whe thei: discovery was nomp- cc . 
Instead, the court ruled that Noble and the County were rote -ted 
by the Utah Governmental Immuni ty Act from bed ng s u e d • ~ - a;r 
e r i: o i s , o in I s : j "* * 11 I d IIIII :i s i: e p r e s e i i t: a 11 o n s a i I d cons*.'..' ., -1 
v 1 o 1 a 11 o n s ; 1 -', - 4 2 4 5 . ) 
This cai /as subsequently certified for appi sa 1 T1: ie 
: y. ' .., ' v appe .: . d. 
; \ e :. i. j : 
I >rt r.c :* 
IX. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case presents a number of issues of first impression 
and other important issues for determination. 
The first issue is whether Utah Const, art. I, § 11 is 
violated when the Utah Governmental Immunity Act is applied to 
shield local governments from liability in tort. 
The second issue is whether the negligent failure to 
enforce the Uniform Building Code and/or the negligent issuance of 
a temporary certificate of occupancy, in violation of the UBCr 
creates a liability for recovery against the County, or Noble and 
is allowed under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. Utah Code 
Ann. § 63-30-10 and § 63-30-10.5. Other states allow recovery. 
See, e.g. , Lotter v. Clark County, 793 P.2d 1320 (Nev. 1990); 
Brennen v. City of Eugene, 285 Or. 401, 591 P.2d 719 (1979) 
(negligent issuance of a license). 
The third issue presented by this appeal is whether the 
Governmental Immunity Act bars the Debrys' claims for fraud and 
misrepresentation. 
The fourth issue presented on appeal is whether the 
County and Noble, based on the Governmental Immunity Act, are 
immune from suit for violating the DeBrys1 rights guaranteed by the 
1st, 5th and 14th Amendments of the United States Constitution. 
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X 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UTAH'S GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT, AS APPLIED BY Tl IE 
TRIAL COURT, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
A. F a. c t u a 1 B a c k q r ou n d. 
The trial court held, as a matter of 3 aw, that Utah's 
Governmental Immur . * .-c4 mandated summary judgment i i 1 favor of 
bo ! Cc i mty f f l s cl ai ms : ^f i legligei ice, 
f r a u d a n d d e n i a 1 o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a 1 r i g h t s . 
In t h e l ower c o u r t , t h e DeBrys c .-J r<^ * .H ^f t <- v ! ;-
c a t i o i i o f 11 i e G o ^  ;r e r nin e i 11 a ] I mini 11 i :i t y . - . - .. h 
Const, art. I, § 11 and to the extent :u* i :\ *t ui.i^.s :is?;iiss- , o: 
the DeBrysf cla ims, tl le Act is unconstitutional, v-^ ' JO/O, J^UG -
3 9 0 3 . ) 
B. Legal Analysis. 
1. Application of Section 63-30-4 to the claims against 
Noble. 
At common law, a governmental employee could be sued indi /id-
ually notwi thstand ing the immunity of the go v/ ernmei it a] ei iti t> i 
The Anglo-American tradition did not include a 
general theory of immunity from, suit or from, 
liability on the part of the public officers. 
It was the. boast of Dicey, often quoted, that 
" [w]ith us every official from the prime 
minister down to a constable or a collector of 
taxes, i s i i n d. e r t h e s a m e r e s p o n s i b i 1 i t y £ o r 
every act done without legal justification as 
any other citizen." James. Tort Liability of 
Governmental Units, 2 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 610, 
635 (1955) (footnote omitted). 
Similarly, in Utah, government employees could be sued 
for negligence in performing their ministerial duties. In Frank v. 
State, 613 P.2d 517, 520 (Utah 1980) the Court stated: 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act has no 
application to individuals; its function is 
confined to governmental "entities." Common-
law principles of sovereign immunity have 
developed, however, which offer protection to 
the individual under certain circumstances. 
The case of Cornwall v. Larsen stands for the 
proposition that a governmental agent 
performing a discretionary function is immune 
from suit for injury arising therefrom, 
whereas an employee acting in a ministerial 
capacity, even though his acts may involve 
some decision making, is not so protected. 
(Citations omitted.) 
However, under the current version of Utah's Governmental 
Immunity Act, a governmental employee is individually liable only 
in the case of fraud or malice. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 11 guarantees access to the courts 
and a remedy by due course of law which shall be administered. 
without denial: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay, and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this state, 
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by himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he i s a party. 
The 1 eadj ng case on Arti c 1 e I, Section 3 2 is Berr v v. 
Beech Aircraft. Cor p ; 2 ; I " 2 ::! 6 ; 0 (IJ tali 1 985) I discussing the 
conflict whi ch arises between the provisions of Section II 1 ai id the 
p 0 w e r 0 f the legislature to limit ri ghts and remedies, the court 
stated: 
We hold th Is section 1 1 of the Declaration of 
Rights and the prerogative of the legislature 
are properly accommodated by applying a two-
part analysis. First, section 11 is satisfied 
if the law provides an injured person an 
effective and reasonab 1 e a 11 e r n a t i v e r e m e d y 
nby due course of law" for vindication of hi s 
constitutional interest. The benefit provided 
by the substitute must be substantial ly equal 
in value or other benefit to the remedy 
abrogated in providing essentially comparable 
substantive protection to one's person, 
property, or reputation, although the form of 
the substitute remedy may be different. 
* * * 
S e c o n d, i f t h e r e i s i I o s u b s t i t u t e o r 
alternative remedy provided, abrogation of the 
remedy or cause of action may be justified 
only if there is a clear social or economic 
evil to be eliminated and the elimination of 
an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary 
or unreasonab 1 e m e a n. s f o r a c h i e v i n g t h e 
objective. 717 p.2d at 680 (citations 
omitted) . 
In Beech, the Utah court re] :i ed upon New York. Cen tral 
R.R. v. White, 2 4 3 1 J. S . ] 88 (1 91 ; ) v iierein the Ui iitc >d States 
Supreme Court stated: 
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It perhaps may be doubted whether the state 
could abolish all rights of action on the one 
hand, or all defenses on the other, without 
setting upon something in their stead. 243 
U.S. at 201. 
In summary, the lower court's application of Section 63-
30-4 in this case is constitutional under Article I, Section ll1 
only if: (1) an effective and reasonable alternative remedy is 
provided; or (2) a clear social or economic evil is eliminated and 
such elimination is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means of 
meeting the objective. Berry v. Delta Aircraft, supra. 
In the present case, application of Section 63-30-4 to 
abolish the right to sue a county employee for negligence in 
administering and enforcing the UBC violates Section 11 because the 
Legislature did not provide any effective and reasonable method of 
recovery for injuries caused by the failure to administer and 
enforce the building code. Further, Section 63-30-4 does not 
address any existing social or economic evil. Therefore, the 
abolition of the common law right to sue governmental employees for 
ministerial acts is arbitrary and does not reasonably and substan-
tially advance any legitimate legislative purpose. In fact, 
*In the recently decided case of Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 
794 P. 2d 838 (1990) , the Utah Supreme Court noted that applications 
of immunity had the potential to create conflicts with Article I 
Section 11. 
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elimination of governmental empl oyee accountabi] i ty is likely to 
create e v i 1 a n d in, I s c h I e f a n d e ] i m I n a t e s i n d I \ I d u a 1 r e s p o n s i fa i 3 i t y. 
The net result will be to induce governmental employees to be less 
c a r e f u l and p r o f ess i o n a 1 a n d e n c o u r a g e h a r m f u 1 p e r f o r in a i I c e , d 
carelessness, F Ina 1 1 y, Sec11on 63-30 -4 is arb11rary because xt 
applies to a] 1 1 eveIs of misconduct ranging from, discretionary 
p o ] i c > in a k i n g d e c i s i o n s t • :: • 1:1 i « = m : • s t: t :i : i > :ii a ] a c t s c: f 1 I « y 
employees. 
For these reasons, the tria1 court's app] i cation of Section 
63- 3 0 4 to bar al ] of tl le DeBr y s , cl aJ ins agai i is t Nobl e for damages 
caused by hi s minister ial acts violates I Jtah Const, ar t, I, § .1 1. 
2. Application of Section 63-30-4 to the claims against the 
County. 
Immuni ty o f s t a t e governme nt st a nds o n a diff e re n t 
footing than i mmunity of a county ft t common law, the state was 
immune from sui t. Madsen v. Borthick, 65 8 I 2d 6 2 I ., 62 9 (I Jtah 
1983) . On the other hand, counties wer e routinely sued In both 
state and federal courts . Owe! I v. C:i ty o f Independence , 4 4 5 I J, S . 
6 6 2 (19 8 0) t i c o u i I t y r e t a i n e d 1 i m i t e d i m m u n i t y f o r s t r i c 11 y 
gover nment a 1 funet ion s b u t there was n o common 1 a w immun11y for 
proprietary functions. I d. 
In Madsen v. Borthick, supra.,», the Utah Supreme Court 
ruled that the governmental immunity act, as applied to state 
officials, did not violate Article I, Section 11 because immunity 
of state government had always existed. 658 P. 2d at 629. 
(Emphasis added.) However, immunity for the proprietary acts of a 
county did not exist at common law. At common law, the state could 
delegate a limited form of immunity to a political subdivision for 
strictly governmental functions. However, under common law, states 
could not delegate immunity to counties for proprietary functions. 
Owen v. City of Independence, supra, at 645, n. 27 and n. 28; 
Weiner v. Metropolitan Trans. Authority, 435 N.Y,S.2d 594 (1981), 
Time and time again, this Court emphasized that there 
simply is no immunity for county proprietary functions. Hansen v„ 
Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 838 (1990); and in Standiford v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Utah 1980). As set forth in 
the Statement of Facts section of this brief, the DeBrys are suing 
the County for negligently performing its proprietary functions, 
i.e., for negligent inspection and enforcement of the County's 
building code. At common law, the County was not immune. No 
alternative remedy is provide to the DeBrys. No economic evil is 
eliminated. Thus, application of the Governmental Immunity Act to 
bar the DeBrys1 claims against the County violates Utah Const, art. 
I, § 11. 
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POINT II 
A. 
summa: 
?i .1.. . r. .-• 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON ALL OF THE DEBRYS' CLAIMS 
c> r \ r- i. ;J ••• 
'Udgment 
* s entry of 
*'usi on that 
: /s claims 
err: . eve*.-. No;
 t e 
Summa: 
1) A 
2) 
3) 
4) 
5) 
6) 
ar, ry Act does 
r v .late It^ri Con^t 
• l . l ^ . u t : . 
;; f i 11 e i r 
,e J st, 5th 
States and -ith Amendments to the United 
Coi isti tiiti • :>i I ; 
There are no factual issues to determine whether 
t he fu nct io n s perf ormed were government a1 as 
0 p p o s e d t c p i: o p r i e t a i : y; 
1 f g o v e r n m e n t a .1 i mm u n i t y h a s n o t b e e n w a i v e d; 
There a r e n o f a c t u a ] i s s u e s 1: o d e t e rm i n e wh e t h e r 
1:1 i e c o i i :i 1 1 y a c t s a i I d d i 11 i e s w e i: e m i i 11 s t e r i a ] i a 1:1 i e r 
than discretionary; 
The Governmental Immunity Act applies to all of the 
DeBry s" claims; 
7) Summary judgment was entered after an adequate time 
allowed for discovery. Downtown Athletic Club v. 
Hormon, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah App. 1987). 
Point I of this brief shows that application of the 
Governmental Immunity Act violates Utah Const, art. I, § 11, Point 
III of this brief identifies the constitutional rights the lower 
court denied the DeBrys. Point IV argues that summary judgment is 
premature. This section will address issues (3) through (6). 
B. Fact Issues Must be Resolved to Determine Whether the County 
and Noble Performed Governmental or Proprietary Functions. 
The leading case on governmental immunity is Standiford 
v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 1980). In Standiford 
the Court stated: 
We, therefore, hold that the test for deter-
mining governmental immunity is whether the 
activity under consideration is of such a 
unique nature that it can only be performed by 
a government agency or that it is essential to 
the core of government activity2. 
605 P.2d at 1236-37. 
2This test may be deemed modified by the 1987 legislature in 
its amendment to the Governmental Immunity Act. However, any such 
changes would have only prospective application and would not apply 
to this case. See, Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989); Gibson v. Commonwealth, 415 
A.,2d 80 (Pa. 1980); Bershefsky v. Commonwealth, 418 A.2d 1331 (Pa. 
1980) . 
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As stated i n Mad sen v. Borthicl :, 658 P. 2d 62 7, 63 0 (Utah 
1983 ) tl le Standi ford r ul e requi res a t/w o-step anal ysi si 
Under [the Standiford] framework, the right to 
maintain an action against the State or its 
political subdivision can result (1) from a 
f i n d i n g t h a t t h e i n j u r y d i d i I o t r e s u 11 f r o m 
the exercise of a government function, or (2) 
from a finding that even though the injury 
resulted from,, the exercise of a governmental 
function, the government immunity has been 
expressly waived in one of the secti ons of the 
act. 
Tl HE r e a s o i is f c -i ::: i: e .at j i ig tl i a S t a n d i f o r d :.-. - w 1 :i j ch 
b r o a d e n e d 11 i e 11, a b i 1 i t y o f g o v e r n m e n t a 1 e n t i t i e s , I s t o i 
.allow more ini locent victims Injured by 
tortious conduct on the part of public 
entities access to the courts for redress. 
Fewer such people will be mercilessly and 
senselessly barred from recovery for their 
injuries sustained at the hand of the entities 
designed to serve them. Standiford, supra, at 
1237. 
In this case, the DeBrys cl aim that they were i r ijure> :t by 
1:1 i e ]: i e g ] i g e i I c e o f t h e C o i I :i I t > a i I d N o b ] e 11 I c a r r y i n g o u t t h e m a n d a t e s 
of the County's Bui lding Code, The injuri es complained of occurred 
as a result of ministerial acts and omissions to art m '.'io)nt. ion 
o£ the Code. Specificai1y, tact issues exist as to whet hoi the 
carrying out of required inspections and Issuance of a temporary 
cert If Icate of occupancy as mandated by the Code are qovrirnraei ital 
functions or proprietary functions. 
A governmental function is: 
. . • of such a unique nature that it can only 
be performed by a government agency or that it 
is essential to the core of governmental 
activity. 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., supra, at 123 6. 
In Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 629 P.2d 432, 434 
(Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court explained: 
The first part of the Standiford test— 
activity of such a unique nature that it can 
only be performed by a governmental agency— 
does not refer to what government may do, but 
to what government alone must do. 
The enforcement and administration of the building code 
are not "essential to the core of governmental activity." In Cox 
v. Utah Mortgage & Loan Co. , 716 P.2d 783 (Utah 1986). The City of 
Pleasant Grove made an argument similar to that of the County in 
this case. 
Pleasant Grove contends that it alone, within 
the limits of its jurisdiction, must adopt and 
apply ordinances regulating zoning and sub-
divisions and perform all the concomitant 
duties attendant to those functions. 716 P.2d 
at 785. 
In rejecting the argument, the Supreme Court stated: 
The enumeration of those functions misdirects 
the focus away from the precise activity, viz. 
whether the supervision of disbursements from 
escrowed funds was of such a unique nature 
that it could only be performed by a govern-
mental entity or whether it was essential to 
the core of governmental activity. The answer 
to that inquiry is clearly no. The super-
vision of disbursements from escrowed funds is 
not sui generis governmental. Id. 
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In the present case, the County misdirected the focus of 
inquiry by stati ng i t aloi le must adopt ai id appl^ tl le building code 
standar JJ li . * jaestion. Rather, the questioi 1 is 
w h e t h > • i i 1 g a i i d p a s s i i i g b i :i :i ] d :i i 1 g s f o r C o d e 
comply _4. ., . >^i jfcr.ei'xs governmental" and "could only be 
per for-<-..: ic vernr-ent."- I •'r* ity , " Co.\ , supra -.: £-", 
£ sso C ox the 
Court nti +* r 
The super\,L :..;: .: ^^.^bursements from escrowed 
funds is r.ot sui generis governmental. In is 
handled daily by private individuals and 
private as well ^ ^ublic institutions. Id 
1 - ..o t lie ] c: wer 
court ' • *.h- 1,-1 i ^  i < iia. i I"; • aises ;-i i..-. . i. cuettic-i.- on. the Issi le, 
if no4 nr^ .-:** * * *. UICJL as an issue upon wnich there is a 
dispu' . _ , . ~ 
Building c ode c omp 1 1 a nc e In sp e c11ons are n ot 
unique to government. Building code compli-
ance inspections are often requested by 
persons or firms other than, governments. For 
example, housing lenders and insurance 
companies frequently need to know if a 
building m e ets a p p 11, c a b 1 e c o d e s. I n s u c h 
instances, they may retain services of a 
private person or firm to conduct building 
inspectio n s a r c h 11 e c t u r a 1 a. n d e n g i -
neering firms may contract with a. [private] 
firm . . . to provi de i nternrpfat Ion servi ces. 
Affidavit of James E. Brogan, (R. 39. - , ) 
Indeed, the County has itself, on occasion, contracted 
with private firms to conduct services required under the UBC 
Ernest Hughes, a county employee, stated in his Affidavit: 
• . . [W]hen the Plans Examination Office [of 
Salt Lake County] is very busy, they will con-
tract out plan examinations to private archi-
tects, engineers, and International Conference 
of Building Officials plan checking services. 
(R. 3936-41) (affidavit of Ernest Hughes at paragraph 5). 
Other states conclude that enforcement of the building 
code is a proprietary rather than a government function. In Wilson 
v. Nepstad, 282 N.W.2d 664 (Iowa 1979), the Iowa Supreme Court 
imposed liability for a negligent inspection. The Municipality 
claimed it was immune from suit for a negligent inspection. The 
Municipality further stated that if it were to be held responsible 
for negligent inspections, it would quit performing any 
inspections. In rejecting the Municipality's claim to immunity, 
the Iowa Supreme Court stated " . . . no inspection is better than 
a negligent one11 and that: 
In the event of withdrawal [of governmental 
inspectors], the void might be filled by 
private agencies whose certificates could be 
relied upon by persons risking their lives and 
property. . . . 
282 N.W.2d at 673-674 (emphasis added). 
In some states such a process has already begun. For example: 
It is very common in California for Munici-
palities to contract with [private] consulting 
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firms , t o d o b u 1 1 d :i n g c o d e c o m p 11 a n c e 
inspections :i t is also very common for 
governmental units to contract with private 
persons or firms to review proposed building 
plans for compliance with bui]ding codes 
Affidavit of Mr'" • ; «- : i - " r. ,„ 6 (R 393 
UL ,.-... . ^ . n m e n t a l immunity was apparently 
copied from v* ;h.Jc - Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp. , 
supra , . 11 1 "* =in I i s persu*i;;;. i< 'n 1 iI Brand 
v. Hartman, ; >. - (Mich. App. 1983), the Court held that 
building inspect .or, :•/*. : r covered by governmental immunity The 
y r u n t ' '•'trit*ji
 t uin orci I nanci- 1 is n o t of t h e ui.'.sefiui;1 o f 
governing n • . sense : - :\e expression Il 13 2 N,W,2d at 4813. 
Further, number of other states where the question 
has t-.i!" Iseri
 n m imposed tor negligent inspect:.. :ms. 
See , e.g. Lotter v. Clark County, supra; Wilson v. Nepstad, suora, 
Brand v. Hartman , supra , Ad ams v * State, 555 P 2d 2 3 5 -1-' i 
197C); Brown v , Syson, 135 Ax I z, 567, 663 P. 2d 252 (Ar ,p. 
1 9 8 3 ) ; young v. City of Inglewood, 154 Cal , Rptr. 724, 92 CI u pp. 
3d -13 7 (1979) ; 'Winters v. City of Commerce City, 64 8 : ' 5 
{cv1 o „ App, LyU2 ) ; Jones v. City of St. Maries, 727 P. 2d 11 61 (Ida. 
1986); Stewart v. Schmeider, 3 86 So.2d 13 51 (La, 1 9 8 0 ) ; Landsfield 
v. R. J Smith Contractors Inc. , 2 46 M i c :1 i P. }: >p 632 381 1 J \ ? 2d 
3The "essence of governing" test was later abandoned by the 
Michigan Court in Ross v. Consumers Power Co. , 3 63 N.W.2d 641, 658-
60 (Mich, 1984) . 
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782 (1985); Garrett v. Holiday Inns, 447 N.E.2d 717 (N.Y. App. 
1983); Sexstone v. City of Rochester, 301 N.Y.S.2d 887 (1969); 
O'Brien v. Egelhoff, 459 N.E.2d 886 (Ohio 1984); Campbell v. City 
of Bellevue, 530 P.2d 234 (Wash. 1975); Wood v. Mil in, 397 N.W.2d 
479 (Wise. 1986). 
In short, inspection of buildings is far from the "core 
of governmental activity." Private enterprise is deeply involved 
in the activity. In fact, as suggested by the Iowa Supreme Court 
in Wilson, perhaps the private sector can do a better job. At the 
very least, the lower court should have held a trial to receive 
evidence to determine whether building inspections and issuing 
certificates of occupancy are core governmental activities as 
required by Standiford. 
C. Even if the Injury Resulted From a Governmental Function, 
Immunity Has Been Expressly Waived. 
If this Court determines that the inspection of buildings 
under construction is not a governmental function, that is the end 
of the analysis, and the Court should reverse the order of the 
trial court granting summary judgment and remand the case for 
trial. 
However, if this Court concludes that the inspection of 
building construction is a uniquely governmental function and that 
the Governmental Immunity Act is constitutional as applied to this 
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case4; a, determi nation, needs to be, ir :' » iu wnet; * * t~ 
i i l e d • :: f 1: y !:::,]!: le DeBrys :i s cov *v »nw «^ * x di . :J 
waivers of immunity, The analysis begins with Utah Code Ann, § 63-
30-10,, Section 63-30-10 specifically waives ijpvernmont'ri I immunity 
\\ l L 1 I 11 t l.1 W I J i:> L <J ti (r X i J t. p 1 1 O IT S I 
(] ) Immunity from suit of a ] 1, governmental 
entities is waived except if the 
injury: 
(a) arises out, of the exercise of per-
formance or the failure to exercise or 
perform a discretionary function. . . ; 
or 
(c) arises out of the Issuance, denial, 
suspension or revocation of, or by fai 1-
ure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or 
revoke, any permit:, license, [or] certi-
ficate or 
(d) arises out of a failure to make an 
inspection, 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5 
4It should be, noted that the immunity created by k G J - 30- 'J is 
for "governmental entitles" which term, is defined in § 63-30-2(3) 
as "the State and its political subdivisions." Thus, such immunity 
does not apply, by definition, to defendant Nob If? Immunity for 
Noble was grounded on § 63-30-4(3). 
5That is, they would be barred If we assume that the activities 
are governmental functions, a fact whi ch is hotly contested. 
Plaintiffs presented evidence by Affidavit to show they were not. 
Therefore; i t was improper for the trial court to grant Summary 
Judgment on this issue, Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 13 6 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 26, 31 (1990) , It would appear that a myriad of factual 
issues surround the legal determination of "governmental function" 
as defined In the cases cited hereinabove, thus precluding Summary 
Judgment on the Issue, 
A number of the DeBrys' claims fall outside the waiver 
exceptions set forth in Section 63-30-10. 
First, the DeBrys claim that the building was constructed 
in violation of a County stop work order. The stop work order was 
not enforced as a result of the negligence of Noble and the others 
in his department. The failure to enforce a "stop work order,11 
which by force of law prohibits construction, is not a listed 
exception to § 63-3 0-10. County employees have no discretion to 
fail to obey the law or to act or fail to act in compliance 
therewith. See, Brennen v. City of Eugene, supra at 727. There-
fore, immunity has been waived for this claim. 
Second, the DeBrys claim that the County failed to follow 
and enforce its own regulations by permitting the contractor to 
construct the building and obtain a temporary certificate of 
occupancy when there was no valid building permit and a stop work 
order was extant. Noble knew the only permit was a footings and 
foundations permit, not a full building permit. The failure to 
insist on compliance with the Code and failure to enforce existing 
laws and regulations is not a listed exemption to immunity under § 
63-30-10. Public policy demands that members of the public be 
allowed to assume the County will follow its own laws and that 
If it is ultimately determined on the facts that building 
inspections are not governmental functions, it makes no difference 
whether or not the activities fall under § 63-30-10. 
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there be a recovery for damage caused by its failure to do so. 
See, Wilson v. Nepstad, supra; Brennan v. City of Eugene, supra. 
Indeed, as observed by the Wilson court: "No inspection is better 
than a negligent one" 282 N.W.2d at 673. Further, the Brennan 
case, supra, explains the principle that a city may well be 
immunized from liability for the policy decision relating to the 
type of and manner in which inspections are to be performed, in 
which case liability would not lie for a decision not to inspect. 
Such immunity is granted by the Utah Legislature in § 63-30-
3(l)(d). However, as has been recognized by numerous courts, 
including the Brennen court, once the task, such as performing an 
inspection, is undertaken by a government employee, liability 
exists for the negligent failure to properly perform the task.6 
Nevada has a statute similar to Utah's Section 63-3 0-
10(1) (d) which provides immunity from actions for failure to 
inspect. (See N.R.S. 41.033). However, Nevada has held that there 
is no immunity if the County had knowledge of a defect and failed 
to act. See., Butler v. Bogdanovich, 101 Nev. 449, 705 P.2d 662, 
6The language of § 63-30-3(1)(d) provides immunity for "failure 
to make an inspection"; however, no immunity is granted for an 
inspection undertaken by the county and then negligently or 
illegally performed. Thus, plaintiffs1 claims that the negligence 
of county inspectors in failing to follow the requirements of the 
code during the performance of inspections and concurrent 
negligence in failing to discover lack of a building permit and 
existence of a stop work order is not covered by the exception to 
the general waiver of immunity found in Subsection (1)(d). 
29 
663 (1985). Indeed, in the recent case of Lotter v. Clark County, 
supra, the Nevada Supreme Court held that an allegation that had 
the County inspected, a defect would have been discovered, stated 
a cause of action. 
The reasoning of the courts in Standiford, Brennan., 
Wilson, Butler and Lotter is compelling. The failure to enforce 
the county's own laws and regulations is not a listed exception to 
the general waiver of immunity in set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 63-
3 0-10. This Court should hold that there is no immunity for such 
a failure. Standiford v. Salt Lake Countyf supra; Lotter v. Clark 
County, supra; Wilson v. Nepstad, supra; Brennan v. City of Eugene, 
supra. The public has a right to rely upon the county performing 
those tasks the County undertakes to perform, in a non-negligent 
manner. 
In summary, immunity from the Debrys' claims based upon 
the County's failure to follow regulations and enforce a stop work 
order is waived by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10. 
In addition to the foregoing, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10.5 
(1987) provides for a waiver of immunity which applies to this 
case: 
Immunity from suit of all governmental 
entities is waived for the recovery of 
compensation from the governmental entity when 
the governmental entity has taken or damaged 
private property without just compensation. 
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The focus is on the word damage. Because of the County's 
negligence (see generally, Facts section above), plaintiffs1 
property has been damaged. Governmental immunity for claims for 
recovery for the damages is specifically waived. 
D. Fact Issues Exist Which Must be Resolved to Determine Whether 
the Duties of the County and Noble are Ministerial Functions 
not Protected by Statutory Immunity. 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined "discretionary" 
functions as those at "the basic policy making level" and not those 
which concern "routine, every day matters, not requiring evaluation 
of broad policy factors." Carrol v. State Road Commission, 27 Utah 
2d 384, 388, 496 P.2d 888, 891 (1972); re-affirmed in Biaelow v. 
Inqersoll, 618 P.2d 50, 53 (Utah 1980). 
In other words, discretionary immunity under § 63-30-
10(1)(a) shields: 
[t]hose governmental acts and decisions 
impacting on large numbers of people in a 
myriad of unforeseeable ways from individual 
and class actions, the continual threat of 
which would make public administration all but 
impossible. Frank v. State, supra at 520. 
The implementation of previously made policies and 
procedures is not-discretionary. Recent Utah cases illustrate 
application of this principle. In Little v. Utah State Division of 
Family Services, 667 P.2d 49 (Utah 1983), the court held that the 
decision to place a foster child was discretionary, but the 
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implementation of the decision was not. In Doe v. Arguelles, 716 
P.2d 279 (Utah 1985), the decision to place a prisoner on parole 
was found to be discretionary, while the implementation of the 
decision was non-discretionary. 
In the present case, the decision to adopt the Uniform 
Building Code and to require compliance therewith was 
discretionary, a legislative decision. However, the day-to-day 
enforcement of the Code is ministerial. See, Affidavit of James 
Brogan at paragraph 8-9. (R. 3931.) 
The recent case of Jones v. City of St. Maries, 772 P.2d 
1161 (Ida. 1986), is illustrative. Plaintiff claimed the City 
negligently inspected water mains and fire hydrants. The City 
claimed immunity. The Idaho Supreme Court stated: 
The ^planning/operational test1 [is used] for 
determining whether a particular governmental 
action is discretionary. . . . The planning/ 
operational test provides immunity for 
planning activities—activities which involve 
the establishment of plans, specifications and 
schedules where there is room for policy 
judgment and decisions. Operational 
activities — activities involving the 
implementation of statutory and regulatory 
policy—are not immunized and, accordingly, 
must be performed with ordinary care. 
Id. at 1163-64. 
Other courts have held that checking building plans for 
compliance with legal requirements is a non-discretionary act for 
which liability may be imposed. Adams v. State, supra (liability 
for negligent post-inspection enforcement). Stewart v. Schmeider, 
supra (liability for negligent approval of construction plans); 
Landsfield v. R.J. Smith Contractors, Inc., supra (determining and 
enforcing compliance with building code is ministerial-opera-
tional) . J. Gregcin, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 593 P.2d 1231, 1254 
and 615 P.2d 419 (Or. App. 1979) Affd. 516 P.2d 419 (liability for 
negligent approval of subdivision). Likewise, the enforcement of 
compliance with building codes is non-discretionary. J&B 
Development Co. v. King County, 669 P.2d 468 (Wash. 1983) 
(liability for negligent approval of building plans); Hawes v. 
Germantown Mut. Ins. Co., 309 N.W.2d 356 (Wis. App. 1981) 
(liability for improper application of building code in approving 
plans). Furthermore, the enforcement of stop work orders is not a 
basic policy decision entitled to immunity. OfBrien v. Ecrelhoff, 
supra. Thus, the various omissions by the County and Noble are not 
discretionary and do not fall within Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-
10(1)(a). 
At a minimum, there are factual issues which must be 
determined before a proper resolution of the immunity question can 
be made. In Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City 
Corp. , supra, the court held that in a case decided on motion 
below, the Utah Supreme Court did not have the benefit of a factual 
record and could not, therefore, determine as a matter of law 
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whether the acts complained of were discretionary. 784 P. 2d at 
464. The same situation occurred in Hansen v. Salt Lake County, 
supra. The same situation exists in the present case. The factual 
issues need development and, therefore, it was error for the trial 
court to grant the County's motion for summary judgment. 
E. The Governmental Immunity Act Does Not Bar the DeBrys' Claims 
for Fraud and Misrepresentation. 
1. Factual background. 
The DeBrys sued the County and Noble for fraud and 
concealment. Noble issued a temporary certificate of occupancy at 
a time when by his own testimony he knew there was not a valid 
building permit. A temporary certificate of occupancy is a 
representation by the County that all permits are in order, all 
required inspections have been made and no hazard will result from 
occupancy of the building. See U.B.C. §307(d). These represen-
tations were false and Noble knew or should have known they were 
false. 
2. Legal analysis. 
Fraud is a generic term which embraces all the 
multifarious means which human ingenuity can 
devise and are resorted to. . . . [I]t 
comprises all acts, omissions and concealments 
involving a breach of legal or equitable duty 
and resulting damage to another. 
Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1978). 
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The elements of fraud are: (1) a false representation of 
an existing material fact; (2) made knowingly or recklessly for the 
purpose of inducing reliance thereon; (3) upon which there was 
reliance to the other party's detriment. Id. at 875. Fraud 
includes not only affirmative misrepresentations but also conceal-
ment when there is a duty to speak. Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 
379, 384 P.2d 802 (1988). 
In this case, neither the County nor Noble argued that 
any of the factual elements of fraud are lacking. Likewise, the 
lower court did not base its ruling on whether the elements of 
fraud are factually present. Instead, the lower court ruled that 
the Governmental Immunity Act bars all of the DeBrys' claims. 
The court's ruling clearly was in error. Fraud, 
concealment and gross negligence are not exempted from suit under 
Section 63-30-32. In fact, the Governmental Immunity Act 
specifically authorizes lawsuits for fraud against governmental 
employees. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-4. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO IMMUNITY AGAINST DEBRYS1 CLAIMS 
FOR DEPRIVATION OF THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
A. Introduction. 
The 1st Amendment protects the DeBrys1 rights to petition 
the government for a redress of grievances. The 5th Amendment 
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prevents the DeBrys from being deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law. Both of these rights are 
applicable to the states by way of the due process clause in the 
14th Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 
The DeBrys sued the County for depriving them of their 
constitutional rights guaranteed by the 1st, 5th and 14th 
Amendments. 
Specifically, the DeBrys claimed that the County deprived 
the DeBrys1 constitutional rights by: 
1. Evicting the DeBrys as retaliation for the DeBrys 
filing a complaint with and against the County. 
2. Engaging in a systematic failure to enforce the 
law. 
The DeBrys claimed that the violation of their consti-
tutional rights caused them damage including the loss of use of 
their property (the building). (R. 3390-91.) 
The lower court did not determine whether the DeBrys were 
factually deprived of any constitutional rights nor whether the 
DeBrys sustained damages. What the court did do, was hold that the 
County and Noble are immune from suit. (R. 4243-45.) However, 
because there is no immunity for abridging an individual's 
constitutional rights, the decision of the lower court must be 
reversed and the constitutional claims set for trial. e.g., Owen 
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v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Martinez v. 
California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980); Bateson v. Geisse, 857 F.2d 1300 
(9th Cir. 1988); Grandstaff v. City of Borqer, 767 F.2d 161 (5th 
Cir. 1985); Leverett v. Town of Limon, 567 F.Supp. 471 (D.Colo. 
1983); Wilson v. Jackson, 505 A.2d 913 (Md. App. 1988). 
B. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act Does Not Bar the DeBrysf 
Due Process Claims for Retaliation. 
1. Factual basis of the claim. 
Even though the lower court did not determine whether 
there were facts sufficient to establish a due process claim, there 
is a factual basis for the claim summarized as follows: 
The County issued a temporary certificate of occupancy 
allowing the building to be occupied. The temporary certificate 
listed only a few items to be finished or corrected. None of them 
were hazardous or life threatening. (Deposition of Wallace R. 
Noble depo. May 9, 1990 p. 110 (hereinafter "Noble depo. II 
p. . " ) ; Deposition of Carl Eriksson April 23, 1990 pp. 94-96 
(hereinafter "Eriksson depo. p. • " ) • The County's policy and 
practice is to allow repairs to be made while the occupant remains 
in possession of the building. (Noble depo. II. pp. 104-105; 
Eriksson depo. pp. 83-85.) The County's policy is to also notify 
the property owner of completion of the items listed on a temporary 
certificate of occupancy is not proceeding at a satisfactory pace. 
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(Noble depo. II pp. 107-08; Eriksson depo. pp. 95-96.) The notice 
was never given. (Noble depo. II pp. 107-08.) 
This case is the only case in the history of Salt Lake 
County where an occupant has been ordered to vacate a new building 
after a temporary certificate of occupancy has been issued. (Noble 
depo. II pp. 105, 112; Eriksson depo. pp. 40-82.) 
The County's order to vacate was issued soon after the 
DeBry's filed their notice of claim with the County. (Eriksson 
depo. pp. 83, 84.) 
2. Legal analysis. 
The first amendment grants an individual the constitu-
tional right to "petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.11 U.S. Const, amend. I. The DeBrys right to petition 
for redress and the right of free speech are 1st Amendment 
guarantees subject to the same constitutional analysis, e.g. , 
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985); Singh v. Lamar 
University, 635 F.Supp. 737 (E.D. Tex. 1986); see generally. State 
v. Chima, 23 Utah 2d 360, 365, 463 P.2d 807 (1970). 
The rights set forth in the 1st Amendment apply to the 
states and their local government by way of the due process clause 
contained in the 14th Amendment. e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145 (1968); Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328 (10th Cir. 1981); 
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Oney v. Oklahoma City, 120 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1941); State v. 
Phillips, 540 P.2d 936 (J. Maughn, dissenting Utah 1975). 
Due process limits the government's ability to deprive an 
individual of life, liberty or property. Deshoney v. Winnebago 
County Dept. of Social Services, 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989). "Protec-
tion against arbitrary governmental action is the great purpose of 
the due process clause.11 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114 
(1889); Wilwording v. Swenson, 502 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1974). 
Specifically, the 1st Amendment and the due process 
clause prohibit the government from retaliating against an 
individual for exercising his constitutional rights. Blackridge v. 
Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1971). 
In this case, the DeBrys claimed that the County evicted 
them from the building as retaliation for filing a notice of claim 
with the County. 
Presenting a notice of claim is protected speech for 1st 
Amendment purposes. see, Pickering v. Flacke, 453 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 
1018 (N.Y.Supp. 1982). Similarly, the DeBrys1 right to litigate is 
protected by the 1st Amendment. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan 
American World Airways, 604 F.Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1984); Eilers v. 
Palmer, 575 F.Supp. 1259 (D. Minn. 1984). 
The DeBrys have the right to petition for redress without 
the fear of retribution. Simply put, neither the County nor Noble 
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may punish, penalize, investigate or retaliate against the DeBrys 
for exercising their 1st Amendment rights, Lipinski v. Dietrich, 
578 F.Supp. 235 (N.D. Ind. 1984); Grove School v. Guardianship and 
Advocacy Commission, 596 F.Supp, 1361 (N.D. 111. 1984); Abrams v. 
City of Chicago, 635 F.Supp. 169 (N.D. 111. 1986); Martinez v. 
Winner, 771 F.2d 424 (10th Cir. 1985). Whether retaliation exists 
is a question of fact precluding summary judgment. see, Alabama 
State Federation of Teachers AFL-CIO v. James, 6 56 F.2d 19 3 (4th 
Cir. 1981). 
If a jury finds that retaliation exists, neither the 
County nor Noble have statutory immunity for depriving the DeBrys 
of their constitutional rights. Grandstaff v. City of Borger, 
supra; Martinez v. California, supra. 
There simply is no immunity for local government nor its 
employee acting in his official capacity for depriving an 
individual of his constitutional rights. e.g., Owen v. City of 
Independence, 445 U.S. 662 (1980). They are liable for injury 
caused by their unconstitutional policies or practices. Monell v. 
N.Y.C. Department of Social Services, 476 U.S. 65 (1988). Whether 
there is a policy or practice which causes the unconstitutional 
result is a jury question. Video International Products Inc. v. 
Warner Amex Cable Communications, Inc., 858 F.2d 1075, (5th Cir. 
1988) . 
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Similarly, whether Noble has qualified immunity from suit 
in his personal capacity is also a fact question. The common law 
defense of good faith qualified immunity for a governmental 
employee sued in his individual capacity applies when the defendant 
performs his statutory duty honestly and in good faith. Hiorth v. 
Whittenburq, 241 P. 2d 907 (Utah 1952). Whether Noble performed his 
duty honestly and in good faith are both questions of fact. see. 
Smith v. Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 345 (10th Cir. 1973). The lower 
court made no finding and there was no factual showing that Noble 
performed his duties honestly and in good faith. 
In summary, there is a factual issue as to whether the 
County and Noble evicted the DeBrys as retaliation for the Debrys 
exercising their 1st, 5th and 14th Amendment rights to petition 
for redress of their grievances. There is also a factual issue as 
to whether the DeBrys were deprived of their constitutional rights 
pursuant to a practice or policy of the County. The lower court 
could not and did not resolve these fact issues. The court merely 
ruled that the County and Noble are immune from the Debrysf 
constitutional claims. However, there is no statutory immunity for 
local government and its employee acting in his official capacity. 
Moreover, whether Noble has qualified immunity from suit in his 
individual capacity depends upon whether he acted honestly and in 
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good faith, both of which are factual issues precluding summary 
judgment. 
C. The Utah Governmental Immunity Act Does Not Bar the DeBrysf 
Due Process Claims Based on the County's Systematic Failure to 
Enforce the Law. 
1. Factual basis for the claim. 
The facts establishing the County's and Noble's syste-
matic failure to enforce the building code are set forth in the 
statement of the case section of this brief. Essentially, the 
County and Noble: 
1. Failed to require the builder to obtain a building 
permit; 
2. Failed to require the builder to proceed from 
approved plans; 
3. Failed to conduct all the inspections required by 
the UBC; 
4. Conducted haphazard and incomplete inspections; 
5. Failed to require the builder to meet the require-
ments for a temporary certificate of occupancy; 
6. Failed to require the builder to maintain approved 
plans and an inspection record on the construction 
site; and 
7. Failed to enforce its stop work order. 
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As a result of the County's failure to enforce the law, 
the DeBrys purchased a defective office building. The cost to 
repair the building exceeds $333,515. In addition, the County 
prevented the DeBrys from using the building. The additional rent 
paid by the DeBrys totals over $351,6047. 
2. Legal analysis. 
The due process clause prevents local government from 
denying individuals a liberty or property interest without due 
process of law. Martinez v. California, 277 U.S. 279 (1980). A 
"property interest" for due process purposes "denotes a broad range 
of interests that are secured by existing rules or understanding." 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 P.2d 
1243, 1297 (Utah 1982). The property interests are defined broadly 
because: 
The spirit of enterprise which impels a person 
to initiate and develop a business which 
provides services to the public and employment 
for others is vital to the common welfare. Id. 
Specifically, the right to occupy a house or building is 
a property right protected by the due process clause. Buchanan v. 
Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Polenz v. Parrott, 853 F.2d 551 (7th 
Cir. 1989). 
7These figures were developed in testimony at trial of the main 
action. Trial Transcript pp. 698, 845. 
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[A] property right is not just title but the 
right of exclusive use and enjoyment. 
Polenz at 557. 
The DeBrys have a property right to occupy and use their 
building. As such, they are entitled to due process which 
includes, but is not limited to, the County following and enforcing 
its own law. The systematic failure to enforce the law is a denial 
of due process. e.g. , Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 
1978). Specifically, the omission to act in violation of a duty 
imposed by statute is a violation of due process. Id. 
The foregoing principles apply to zoning, building and 
land use laws and regulations. e.g., Southern Co-operative 
Development Fund v. Driggers, 696 F.2d 1347 (11th Cir. 1983). 
Property owners have a due process right which require local 
governments to follow their own laws and regulations in issuing or 
denying zoning, building and occupancy permits. Polenz, supra; 
Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4th Cir. 1983); Leverett 
v. Town of Limon, 567 F.Supp. 471 (D.Colo. 1983); c. f. , West 
Gallery Corp. v. Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners, 58 6 P. 2d 
4 29 (Utah 1978). In this case the court failed to follow its own 
laws and denied the DeBrys their rights to due process and as set 
forth in Point III(D) above, there is no applicable immunity 
available to the County and its employee. 
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POINT IV 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS PREMATURE 
Summary judgment should not be granted until discovery is 
completed since discovery may create genuine issues of material 
fact. e.g., Downtown Athletic Club v. Hormon, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah 
App. 1987), cert, denied 765 P.2d 1277. 
In this case, discovery was and is not complete.8 
Factual issues exist as to whether enforcement of the building code 
and issuing an improper certificate of occupancy are governmental 
functions or proprietary functions. Factual issues exist as to 
whether Noble's errors were performed as part of his ministerial 
duties. Further, practically every element of the DeBrys• claims 
for fraud and concealment require the resolution of factual issues. 
For these reasons, summary judgment is premature. 
8The Motion for Summary Judgment in this case was made and 
granted prior to completion of discovery. Subsequent discovery in 
this case, and a pending case in the United States District Court, 
has revealed evidence that supports a claim of gross negligence by 
Mr. Noble and numerous other employees of his department who 
scheduled and carried out over 12 inspections without even checking 
the file to discover the stop work order and lack of proper 
permits. Inspections also failed to discover obvious structural 
defects. The trial court, had it allowed discovery to unfold prior 
to the Summary Judgment Motion, could have allowed amendment to 
assert gross negligence at the time other amendments to pleadings 
were allowed. Also, the court would have had a better under-
standing of the magnitude of the County's acts had discovery been 
completed prior to hearing the motion. It is generally held that 
Summary Judgment should not be granted prior to the completion of 
discovery. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, supra. 
45 
XI. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court granted summary judgment not because 
there are no genuine issues of material fact, but because it 
erroneously concluded that Utahfs Governmental Immunity Act bars 
the DeBrys' claims. However: 
1. Application of the Governmental Immunity Act 
violates Utah Const, art. I, § 11; 
2. There is no immunity for the DeBrys1 claims for 
deprivation of their constitutional rights; 
3. There is no immunity for the DeBrys1 fraud claims; 
4. Any possible immunity has been specifically waived 
by statute; 
5. There are factual issues which must be resolved to 
determine whether the functions performed were 
governmental as opposed to proprietary; 
6. There are factual issues which must be resolved to 
determine whether the acts and duties are discre-
tionary rather than ministerial; 
7. Summary judgment was premature. 
For the reasons set forth herein, this court should 
reverse the order of the District Court which granted summary 
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judgment to defendants Wallace R. Noble and Salt Lake County and 
remand the case for a trial on the merits of the DeBrys! claims. 
DATED this day of January, 1991. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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E X H I B I T - A 
CONSTITUTION 
of the 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
A M E N D M E N T 1 
Religious and political freedom. 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 
A M E N D M E N T 5 
Criminal actions—Provisions concerning—Due process of law and 
just compensation clauses. 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in 
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual 
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be 
compelled in any cnminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT 14 
Section 1. Citizens of the United States. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. Representatives—Power to reduce apportionment. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the 
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to 
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, 
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for 
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens 
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in 
such State. 
Sec. 3. Disqualification to hold office. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, 
as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged 
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Sec. 4. Public debt not to be questioned—Debts of the Confeder-
acy and claims not to be paid. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But 
neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or 
obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slaves; but all such 
debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. Power to enforce amendment. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
oo-ou-o. i m m u n i t y ui guvci i imciiKax ^ i^xn^o " v m >*%*+*,• 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental 
entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, nursing home, or 
other governmental health care facility, and from an approved medical, nurs-
ing, or other professional health care clinical training program conducted in 
either public or private facilities. 
The management of flood waters and other natural disasters and the con-
struction, repair, and operation of flood and storm systems by governmental 
entities are considered to be governmental functions, and governmental enti-
ties and their officers and employees are immune from suit for any injury or 
damage resulting from those activities. 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or de-
nial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity — 
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Lim-
itations on personal liability. 
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall be 
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar as 
governmental entities or their employees are concerned. If immunity from 
suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability of the 
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting any 
immunity from suit which a governmental entity or employee may otherwise 
assert under state or federal law. 
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injury 
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of such 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority 
is, after the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil action or 
proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or the 
estate of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless the 
employee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice. 
(4) An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity 
in a representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for 
which the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held 
personally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the 
employee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority, 
unless it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or 
malice. 
by negligent act or omission ot em-
ployee — Exceptions — Waiver for in-
jury caused by violation of fourth 
amendment rights. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental enti-
ties is waived for injury proximately caused by a neg-
ligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury: 
(a) arises out of the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary 
function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
or 
(b) arises out of assault, battery, false impris-
onment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, in-
tentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slan-
der, deceit, interference with contract rights, in-
fliction of mental anguish, or civil rights; or 
(c) arises out of the issuance, denial, suspen-
sion, or revocation of, or by the failure or refusal 
to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any permit, 
license, certificate, approval, order, or similar au-
thorization; or 
•# (d) arises out of a failure to make an inspec-
tion, or by reason of making an inadequate or 
negligent inspection of any property; or-
(e) arises out of the institution or prosecution 
of any judicial or administrative proceeding, 
even if malicious or without probable cause; or 
(f) arises out of a misrepresentation by the em-
ployee whether or not it is negligent or inten-
tional; or 
(g) arises out of or results from riots, unlawful 
assemblies, public demonstrations, mob violence, 
and civil disturbances; or 
(h) arises out of or in connection with the col-
lection of and assessment of taxes; or 
(i) arises out of the activities of the Utah Na-
tional Guard; or 
(j) arises out of the incarceration of any person 
in any state prison, county, or city jail or other 
place of legal confinement; or 
(k) arises from any natural condition on state 
lands or the result of any activity authorized by 
the State Land Board; or 
(1) arises out of the activities of providing 
emergency medical assistance, fighting fire, han-
dling hazardous materials, or emergency evacua-
tions. 
(2) Immunity from suit of all governmental enti-
ties is waived for injury proximately caused or aris-
ing out of a violation of protected fourth amendment 
rights as provided in Chapter 16, Title 78 which shall 
be the exclusive remedy for injuries to those protected 
rights. If Section 78-16-5 or Subsection 77-35-12(g) or 
any parts thereof are held invalid or unconstitu-
tional, this Subsection (2) shall be void and govern-
mental entities shall remain immune from suit for 
violations of fourth amendment rights. 1985 
63-30-10.5. Waiver of immunity for taking pri-
vate property without compensation. 
(1) Immunity from suit of all governmental enti-
ties is waived for the recovery of compensation from 
the governmental entity when the governmental en-
tity has taken or damaged private property without 
just compensation. 
(2) Compensation and damages shall be assessed 
63-30-15. Denial of claim for injury — Authority and time 
for filing action against governmental entity. 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district 
court against the governmental entity or an employee of the entity. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year after denial of the 
claim or within one year after the denial period specified in this chapter has 
expired, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of 
state law certified by a court of the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary 
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior 
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originat-
ing with: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or 
(v) the state engineer; 
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adju-
dicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of 
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the 
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of 
a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first de-
gree or capital felony; and 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the 
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the 
matters over wThich the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a 
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(f) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition 
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the 
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals 
under Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chanter 46b 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH, ARTITCLE 1 . s e c , 11 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, wrhich 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
par ty . 1896 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, wrhether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or sifter service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if amy, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutor}7 in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
N E V A D A R E V I S E D S T A T U T E S 
41.033. Conditions and limitations on actions: Failure to inspect or 
discover. 
No action may be brought under NRS 41.031 or against an officer or 
employee of the state or any of its agencies or political subdivisions which is 
based upon: 
1. Failure to inspect any building, structure or vehicle, or to inspect the 
construction of any street, public highway or other public work to determine 
any hazards, deficiencies or other matters, whether or not there is a duty to 
inspect; 
2. Failure to discover such hazard, deficiency or other matter, whether or 
not an inspection is made. (1965, p. 1413; 1967, p. 993; 1977, p. 1537.) 
E X H I B I T - B 
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UNIFORM BUILDING CODE 
Sections: 
15.08.010 Uniform Building Code 
adopted—Amendment of 
Section 304, Fees. 
Amendment of Tabl
 M 
building permit fees. 
15.08.025 Appendix Chapter 7 adopted 
A;i iation control towers 
Amendment of Table Nos. 70-
A and 70-B. 
15.08.010 Uniform Building code adopted— 
Amendment of Section 304, Fees. 
tie Uniform Building Code, as adopted 
by the state as the construction standard to be 
adhered to by political subdivisions of the state (§ 
58-50-17 U.C.A.) is adopted by the count> , 
together with the following chapters of the 
Appendix to the Uniform Building Code: 
Chapter 7. Division L Covered Mall Build-
ings, and Division II. Aviation Control Towers; 
Chapter 11. Agricultural Buildings; 
Chapter 12. Division II. Requirements for 
Group R, Division 4 Occupancies; 
Chapter 23. Division I. Alternate Snow Load 
Design,, and Division II. Earthquake Recording 
Instrumentation 
Chapter 49. Patio Covers; 
Chapter 55. Membrane Structures; 
Chapter 70. Excavation and Grading. 
B. Section 304(c) of the Uniform Building 
Code is amended to read as. follows: 
(c) Plan Review Fees. W hen the valuation 
of the proposed construction exceeds 
$2,000,00, and a plan oi cither data are 
required to be submitted by subsection (b) of 
section 302 of the Uniform Building Code, a 
plan review fee shall be paid at the time of 
submitting plans to the County for review. 
Said plan review fee shall be 40 'percent of the 
building permit fee for R-3 and all M occupan-
cies, and shall be 65 percent of the building 
permit fee; for all other occupancies. 
When, in the opinion of the building offi-
cial, plans can be reviewed over the counter, 
the plan review fee shall not exceed $30.00. 
Plans; w tiicli have been previously reviewed 
and placed in the County's plan card file in 
contemplation of future permit issuance shall 
be charged a plan review fee of $30.00. Such 
plans may "be: used for issuing new permits for 
as long as the plans are on file, except that any 
such plans which are not used, for a period of 
two years must be resubmitted for a full plan 
review, with all required fees, if they are to be 
used again. All such plans are subject to having 
t heir valuation and .fees, adjusted, to current 
rates, and must be brought into compliance 
with any changes' to building codes and ordi-
nances. 
Where plans arc incomplete or changed so 
as to require additional plan review, an addi-
tional plan review fee shall be charged at the 
rate shown in Table No. 3-A. 
G Section 304(e) is amended tc read as fol-
io * si 
(e) Investigation Fees: Work Without a Per-
il! it 
1. Investigation. Whenever any work for 
which a permit is required by this code has 
been commenced without first obtaining said 
permit, a special investigation shall be made 
before a permit may be issued for such work. 
2, Fee. An investigation fee, in addition to 
the permit fee, shall be collected whether or 
not a permit is then or subsequently issued. 
The investigation fee shall be assessed in 
accordance 'with Table No 3-A as amended by 
Section 15.08.020. The payment of such inves-
tigation fee shall not exempt any person from 
compliance with all other provisions of this 
code, nor from, any penalty prescribed by law :, 
(CM, 1048 § 1, 1988) 
{SaJt Lake County 8-89) 
13.U5.UZ! I 
15.08.020 Amendment of Table No. 3-A, 
Building Permit Fees. 
That portion of Table No. 3-A entitled "Other 
inspections and fees," of the Uniform Building 
Code, as adopted by the state of Utah, is 
amended to read as follows: 
OTHER INSPECTIONS AND FEES: 
Rcinspcction fee assessed under provisions of 
Section 305(g) 
Inspection of existing construction (including 
change of occupancy or moving 10 a new loca-
tion) 
Den ioiiiion Pti i nil 
Inspections for which no fee is specifically indi-
cated 
!
 dditional plan review i ecjiured by changes 
add it ions or revisions to approved plans 
Investigation Fee: 
A. For property owner, building on private 
property, for personal use only 
B Ml < it hers 
$30.00 
$30.00 for building 
i n s p e c t i o n , p lus 
$30.00 for each reg-
ulated trade for 
which an inspec-
tion is required or 
requested, not to 
exceed $ 1 2 0 . 0 0 
total 
$30.00(no charge if 
demolition is done 
in conjunction with 
a permit for new 
construction I 
$30.00 pei ho in 
(minimum charge 
— one-half hour) 
$30.00 per hour 
(minimum charge 
— one-half hour) 
50% of the building 
perm it. fee. but not 
over $500.00 
200% of the build-
ing permit fee. but 
not over $2,000.00 
TABLE NO. 70-A — GRADING PLAN REVIEW FEES 
Plan review fees shall be 30 percent of the Grading Permit Fee. 
TABLE NCI 70-B - GRADING PERMI I FEES 
Quantity of cut or fill 
100 cubic yards or less 
100 to 1000 cubic yards 
1000 to 10,000 cubic yards 
10.000 to 100.000 cubic yards 
0 '« 100.000 cubi< 'yards 
Grading Permit Fee 
$20.00 
$20.00 for the first 100 cubic yards 
plus $7.00 for each additional 100 
cubic yards. 
$83.00 for the Hrs .XXCUDK I* 
plus $6.00 ior ea,: • ido.: • • ~.a •» 
cubic yards 
$137.00 for the first 10,000 cubic 
yards plus $30.00 for each addi-
tional 10.000 cubic yards 
$407.00 for the first 100,000 cubic 
yards plus $20.00 for each addi-
tiona 1 10.000 cu bic yards. 
(Orel 1048 § 3, 1988) 
(Ord, 1048 § 2, 1988) 
3 Appendix Chapter 7 adopted— 
Aviation control towers. 
Chapter 7 of the Appendix to the Uniform 
Building Code is adopted as follows: 
Chapter 7. Aviation Coiit i ol rowers 
(Ord. 1059 § 1, 1989) 
15.08.030 Amendment of Table Nos. 70-A 
and 70-B. 
Table Nos. 70-A and 70-B of the Appendix of 
the Uniform Building Code, as adopted by the 
State of Utah, are amended to read as follows: 
469 (Salt Laic County & 89) 
bundle or structure oeioie .lu entire piaris a-u >pe .^;iiv.a::;^ ::> *o: ;. . VMIOIC 
buiiamc or structure nave t^ een ^omitted or approved, provided adequate infor-
mation and detailec statements nave oeen filed complying uith ail ^e-tmrnt 
H\:uirements r ;nn- . J- 'ft n r:e: r M. ;. pc m.' > r. a: i prcceec s m*. * r^. r^k 
•^ .."Ow.: assurance ir;a: \v: p-. ••• ' :or :.m ;ni; 'v-ndtr*: t" \n s- "*e 
CMhte : . 
(b) Retention of Plans, ^ ~ ^.: of approved plans, speculations and com-
putations shall be retained by the building official for a period of not less than 90 
J
~"* from date of completion of the work coverec therein; and one set of approved 
r._..s and specifications shall be returned :o the applicant, and said set shall be 
kept on the s:*e o* tve building «•: 'A^> a: .-. ' ':nv:- o.;-r:r.e which the work 
authorized theeny s m progress. 
(c) Validity of P-rnut 7*:e issuance or granting of a permit or approval of 
plans and specifications shall not 'be construed to be a permit for, or an approval of, 
any violation of any of the provisions of this code or of any other ordinance of the 
jurisdiction. No permit presuming to give at ithority to violate or cancel the 
provisions of this code shall be valid. 
"The issuance of a permit based upon plans, specifications and other data shall 
not prevent the building official from thereafter requiring the correction of errors 
in said plans, specifications and other data, or from preventing building ope-
tions being carried on thereunder when in violation of this code or of .-v 
ordinances of this jurisdiction, 
(d) Expiration. Every permit issued by the "building official under the prov i 
sions of this code shall expire by limitation and become null and void if the 
building or work authorized by such permit is not commenced within 180 days 
from the date of such permit, or if the building or work authorized by such 'permit 
is suspended or abandoned at any time after the work is commenced for a period 
of 180 days. Before such work can be recommenced, a new permit shall be first 
obtained so to do, and the fee therefor shall be one half the amount required for a 
new permit for such work. p:o\ :>;ec no change haw been, mane • v% -,; ^e mj :e 
in the original plans and sper:fkat:on> f •• ^ -.*> and orowc^d f -:ner :r„:t 
such suspension or abandonment has not exeeeaeo one year. 
Any permittee holding an unexpired permit may apply for an ex ten ., ;. w . ... 
time within which he may commence worK un;:*:r that permit when he is unab!e to 
commence work v*itn;n the time required by in::- section :.*: cood and s.ttsfaet --v 
reasons. The building official may extend the ti • >e for action r> tr.e permittee fo~ a 
period not exceeding 1 80 days upon written request by tne permittee showing that 
circumstances beyond the control of the permittee have prevented action from 
being taken. No permit shall be extended more man OP.CZ In order to renew action 
on a permit after expireion nne permittee sha: ;\a\ \ **ev* \:il permit fee 
(e) Suspension or Revocation. ::/.„ JUIIGMIU oiii^iuj iii^, i writing, juy t ,„o 
or revoke a permit issued under the provisions of this code whenever the permit is 
issued in error or on the basis of incorrect information supplier, o, :i; . _iat;un of 
any ordinance or regulation or any of the provisions of this code. 
1982 EDITION 
upon u- :;-D uiyMwdwM :. , (^  iuee not later tr.un , cC ca\s 
•,., - ^-t^- ^+*->-: ~;<o T ien* 
Inspect ions 
Sec, 305, -,a" General. All construction or work lor ^r.;.: ~ ^ v.-jii.s • ^ t red 
• rj.::". r>c subject to inspection by the building official, ana certain tvpes of 
construction sha!: K'; •>- continuous inspection by special inspectors as specified in 
Section 306, 
A •>./ >- •' . • . i.:\ --e :-,:.:.red b} ,v.t :%- .ume of:;eial to verifv that the 
structu-, • \>cated : • :.- -TO::I(C^ with the appro\ed plans. It shall be the duty of 
the penr-iit applicant to cause the work to be accessible and exposed for infection 
purposes. Neither the building official nor the jurisdiction snail 4ce I Mc :o-
expense entailed in the removal or replacement of any material required o a. ;c. • 
inspection., 
(b) Inspection Request, ~: -' .-/! bv the duty of the person doing ::-.c wor* 
authorized, by a permit io notif> the ouilding official that such work is ready for 
inspection. The building official may require that every request for inspection be 
filed at least one working day before such inspection is desired. Such request may 
be in writing or by telephone at the option of the building official. 
• It shall be the duty of the person requesting any inspections required by this 
, . . ;•• provide access to and means for proper inspection of such work 
:• (C) inspection Record Card. Work requiring a permit shall not be commenced 
until the permit holder or his agent shall have posted an inspection record card in a 
conspicuous place on the premises and in such position as to allow the building 
official conveniently to make the required entries thereon regarding inspection of 
the work. This card shall bt mainlined in • J ;): position by the permit holder until 
r;na] approval has been granted r-\ tne hue :\rx officia* 
(d) Approval Required, No work shall oe done on a ^
 t^ . ^: Tit . _a ; r 
structure beyond the point indicated in each successive inspection v^mou; 
obtaining the approval of the building official. Such approval sr.a.l tx _ • cr - % 
after an inspection shall have been made of each successive step in the con-
struction as indicated by each of the inspections required in Subsection (e). . 
. There shall be a final inspection and approval or a'l :vnd;r.ec and structures 
when completed and ready for occupancy or use. 
(e) Required Inspections. Reinforcing steel or -trj.t;.:^ ::u;,;uvvU;K o; .'iiy 
part of any building or structure shall not be covered or concealed without first 
obtaining the approval of the building official.-
Tne building official, upon notification from the permit holder or .ui, arprn 
shall nake the following inspections and shall either approve that portion c; ne 
construction as completed or shall notip* ,Vv" ---TO* h ^ ] ^ - * '«;^ ar^'O v/neiem 
the same fails to comply u-;rh :;-;;< cocc 
1. FOUNDATION INSPECTION; Tc be made after trenches are excavated 
and forms erected and when all :oate:oah to: • -e foundation are delivered on the 
job. Where concrete ov - .i -ontra! mixing plant icommonly term-3^ "!*~ --.: 
mixed*" is to be used. materah; neirc no* he ou ;oc o-b 
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2> CONCRETE SLAB 01 1 I "NDER-F LOOR EVSI >EC I ION: 1 c > be n iat le 
after all in-slab or under-floor building sen ice equipment, conduit, pipir ig 
accessories and other ancillary equipment items are in place but before any 
concrete is poured or floor sheathing installed, n icluding the subfloor, 
3. FRAME INSPECTION: 'To be n lade after the roof,,, all f raming, f u e 
blocking and bracing are in place and all pipes, chimneys and vents are complete 
and the rough electrical, plumbing, and heating wires, pipes, and ducts are 
approved, 
4. I ATH AND/OR GYPSUM BOARD INSPEC1 ION: 1 o be made after all 
lathing and gypsum board, interior and exterior, is in place but before ai iv 
plastering is applied or before gypsum boa rd joints and fasteners are taped,, and 
finished, 
5. FINAL INSI ECTION: To be n lade after i it list i grading and the building is 
completed and read} for occupancy, 
(f) Other Inspectioi is. In addition to tl :te called inspections specified abov e, 
the building official may make or require other inspections of any construction 
work to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this code and other law s 
which are enforced by the code enforcement agency 
(g) Reinspections. A reinspection fee may be assessed for each inspection or 
reinspection when such portion of work for which inspection is called is not 
complete or when corrections called for are not made, 
This subsection is not to be interpreted as requiring reinspection fees the first 
time a job is rejected for failure to comply with the requirements of this code, but 
as controlling the practice of calling for inspections before the job is ready for 
such inspection or reinspection. 
Reinspection fees may be assessed when the permit card is not proper ly posted 
on the work site, the approved plans are not readily available to the inspector, for 
failure to provide access on the date for whicl i inspection is requested, or for 
deviating from plans requiring the approval of the building official 
To obtain a reinspection, the applicant shall file an application theref or in 
writing upon a form furnished for that purpose and pay the reinspection fee in 
accordance with Table No. 3-A. 
In instances where reinspection fees have been, assessed, no additional inspec-
tion of the work will be performed until the required fees have been paid. 
Special Inspect ions 
Sec. 306. (a) General, In addition to the inspections require r\ be. .a/i. .v. 5, 
the owner shall employ a special inspector during construction on the follow*." r 
types of work: 
1. CONCRETE: During the taking of test specimens and placing of all 
reinforced concrete and pneumatically placed concrete. 
EXCEPTIONS: 1. Concrete for foundations conforming to minimum require-
ments of Table No. 29-A or for Group R, Division 3 or Group M, Division 1 
Occupancies, provided the building official finds that a special hazard does not 
exist. 
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premises of a fabricator registered and approved by the building of I icial to 
perforn 1 such work without special inspection. The certificate of registration shall 
be subject to revocation by the building offi.ci.al if it is found that any work, done 
pursuant to the approval is in violation of this code. The approved fabricator shall 
submit a Certificate of Compliance that the work was performed in accordance 
with, the approved plans and specifications to the building official, and to the 
engineer or architect of record... The approved fabricator's qualifications shall be 
contingent on compliance with the following: 
1. The fabricator has developed and submitted a detailed fabrication pi ocedural 
manual reflecting key quality control procedures which will provide a basis for 
inspection control of workmanship and the fabricator plant, 
2. Verifi.cati.on of the fabricator's quality control capabilities, plant and person-
nel as outlined in the fabrication procedural manual shall be by an. approved 
inspection or quality control agency. 
3. Periodic plant inspections shall be coi lducted bv an approv ed inspection or 
quality control agency to monitor the effectiveness of the quality control 
program 
4. It shall be the responsibility of the inspection or quality control agency to 
notify the approving authority in writing of any change to the procedural manual. 
Any fabricator approval may be revoked for just cause. Reapproval of the 
fabricator shall be contingent on compliance with quality control procedures 
during the past year. 
Certificate of Occupancy 
' Sec, 307. (a) Use or Occupancv No building or structure of Group A, ,E, I, H, 
B or R, Division. 1 Occupancy, shall be used or occupied, and no change in the 
existing occupancy classification of a building or structure or portion thereof shall 
be made until the building official has issued a Certificate of Occupancy therefor 
as provided herein. 
(b) Change in Use, Changes in the character or use of a bi lilding shall, not be 
made except as specified in Section 502 of this code. 
(c) Certificate Issued, After final Inspection when it is found that the building 
or structure complies with the provisions of this code and other laws which are 
enforced by the code enforcement agency, the building official shall issue a 
Certificate of Occupancy which shall contain, the following:: 
1. The building permit number. 
2. rhe address of the building. 
3. Fhe name and address of the ow nei : 
4. \ description of that portion of the building for which the certificate is 
issued , 
5 V statement that the described portion of the building complies with the 
requirements of this code for the group and division of occupancy and the 
use for which the proposed occupancy is classified. 
6. Fhe name of the building official,.. 
(d) I e m p o r a r)' C e r t i fi c a t e I f t h e b u i 1 d i n, g o f i i c i a, I, f i, i :i d s t i: I a. t i I o s \ I b s t a i 11 i a 1 
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hazav. v.. re^. e :^ r : i*.;cupv.'-,.\ of .-.i • hu:'.:ine or rvrtio: thereof '^cferc *ue 
sanu s conrie ie , : !.c ;r,a\ : w,c a temporal ' Cert ficate of Occupanc\ **or 'he jse 
of a portion o: portions of a ".* ':i:rr or ^n-e* .'•: ^ ^ " <-n-w^- - .-•-" -i? 
ent:r<: huiidine o* structure 
(e Posting, 'int. e.cr:;!lua- : occupancy Midi ;» 
place on the orerr^ses a no shall no: be removed excep; 
,i \ Revocation 7:u: "u;: ' ^ ;: officia r:ue . v • 
Certificate •. ' K \ :^:<\ :• : c;>oei :r.c p ' ^ i s i o n s of this code w er .e^" 'ne 
certificate is issued ir. error ••• en the ha--iA o* -ncorrect information supplier o: 
when it is deterrence ma: trie building or .tincture or portion thereof :* in 
vjpi',Mnr -s • • \ -* ; •
 : n - . ? ^- -e relation or an1 n* the provisions of tr*.; coo. . 
:')0 :^t-.- ;: a i nspicuous 
.
 #t . >va: eine -fficia\ 
j : . suspend -e\* > -. a 
TABLE NO. 3-A—BUILDING PERMIT FEES 
IOTA. VALUATION 
SLOG 10 
5 ^ ' 00 
S5CKJ.0C sio.oo 
•o 
S25t001.00 to $50,000.00 
S50,O01 00 to 5100,000.00 
5100,001.00 and up 
S J 0.00 in: nie first $500.00 plus S1 50 tor eacn additional 
5100.00 or traction thereof,'to and including 52,000 CXI 
532.50 for the first 52.000.00 plus 56.00 for each addi-
tional SI.000.00 or fraction thereof, to and including 
525,000.00 
5170.50 for the first $25,000.00 plus S4.50 for each 
additional 51,000.00 or fraction thereof, to and includine 
550,000.00 , ,, : 
5283.00 for the first 550,000.00 plus 53.00 Jo: 
additional 51,000.00 or fraction, thereof, to and inc 
5100.000.00 
5^33.00 for the first 5100.000.00 plus 52,50 for each 
additional 51,000 00 or traction thereof 
Other inspections and Fees: 
".srecuons outside of normal business hours 
*:..•;• ^ . T charge—two hours) 
1 kemspection fee assessed under provisions of 
Section 305 (g) . , 
.nspee;ior/tvr \M :: -J. :ee IS spectic;-.: 
ncicaiec 
AQdniona, p.^: re\;ev* re.e.:^e f^  
or revisions :o aprT v -v. * ; 
minimum charec—one-na.: nou: 
S If. 00 per hour 
SI5.00 each 
,1)1" jne lioui 
r * . 0 0 per hour 
E X H I B I T - C 
5 
FRIDAY; MARCH 28, 1986; 2:00 P.M. 
WALLACE RAY NOBLE, 
after having been first duly sworn to tell the truth, 
the whole truth and nothing but the truth, the witness was 
examined and testified as follows: 
MR. DEBRY: Now, before we start, let me make a 
note that I have returned the original exhibits which 
related to the VanWagoner deposition and I have substituted 
photocopies, and I have returned the original to you, Mr. 
Maughan; is that correct? 
MR. MAUGHAN: That is correct. 
MR. LARSEN: Just for the record number eight was 
mine. 
MR. DEBRY: Okay. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DEBRY: 
Q. Would you state your name, please? 
A. Full name is Wallace Ray Noble. 
Q. What is your address? 
A. 1347 East 3930 south. 
Q. By whom are you employed? 
A. Salt Lake County. 
1 Q. What is your title? 
2 A. Chief Building Official. 
3 Q. What are your general duties and responsibilities? 
4 A. To oversee the building inspection division and 
5 oversee the building inspectors and to regulate the 
6 Building Code for Salt Lake County. 
7 Q. How many building inspectors do you have under you? 
8 A. Eleven/ I believe it is right now. We are in the 
9 process of hiring so it is.;. 
10 Q. Who is your immediate supervisor? 
11 A. Now/ Carl Erickson. 
12 Q. Were you here this morning when Mr. VanWagoner 
13 testified? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Did you hear him testify that he had authority to 
16 do electrical inspections as well as plumbing and other 
17 things? 
18 A.* Yes. 
19 Q. That is true? 
20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. So every inspector can inspect for anything? Is 
22 that the way it works? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Okay. Are you acquainted with Mr. Bartel? 
25 A. Yes. 
(Examination by Mr. DeBry) 10 
Q. We will come back to that. 
2 I Now/ calling your attention to December 6th/ did 
3 you come here to this building — by "this building" I mean 
4 4252 South 700 East — to have a meeting with the 
5 developers? 
6 A* Bob VanWagoner called me on the radio and asked my 
7 to come over. When I came/ why/ he was here/ Mr. Bartel 
8 and one other person. 
9 Q. Did the other person identify himself? 
10 A. The supervisor working with Bartel anyway. 
11 I don't know who he was. 
12 Q. Prior to that meeting on December 6/ had you ever 
13 been on these premises for an inspection? 
14 A. No. 
15 Q. Okay. Prior to that meeting on December 6, it was 
16 your testimony you never met Bartel before? 
17 A. No, I hadn't. I may have seen him in the office 
18 but never spoken to the man before. 
19 Q. Prior to December 6/ had you ever had occasion to 
20 look in the file at the documents/ the application and 
21 permits that relate to this building? 
22 A. No. 
23 Q. Tell me what was said at this meeting. Were any 
24 minutes, notes or memorandum kept of that meeting? 
25 A. The only thing I did was leave an inspection 
(Examination by Mr. DeBry) 11 
notice with him. So that was all that was done. 
2 I MR. DEBRY: Let's go ahead and mark that now. 
3 THE WITNESS: All of this information I put here 
4 was information I put on afterwards, you know, who was what 
5 and so forth. 
6 (Exhibit 9 marked) 
7 Q. Showing you Exhibit 9, is that the document 
8 referred to that you worked on? 
9 A* Yes. 
10 Q. At the December 6th meeting? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Okay. Now, I notice on this document there is a 
13 yellow slip of paper. When was that yellow piece of paper 
14 made? 
15 A. After your telephone call to me telling me about 
16 the water problem; the fact that you didn't have any; and 
17 so I just — I'm just making a note to myself just added to 
18 this so I remember where it was. 
19 Really had nothing to do with this nor anything 
20 below this point of — well, let me read for the record 
21 what I actually felt on that day. 
22 Q. Okay. 
23 A. I put on here, "4252 South 700 East is the 
24 property address. Date 12-6-85 time 3:10 p.m. I have 
25 checked building, mechanical, electrical, plumbing and the 
(Examination by Mr. DeBry) 12 
1 fact that it is a commercial." 
2 I did not check the work approved or disapproved. 
3 Anything in violation I did not check. All I used this 
4 paper for was for the following: "Okay for temporary 
5 occupancy for thirty days from this date. Completion of 
6 all on-site and off-site improvements must be done or a 
7 bond for the cost of the improvements must be given to the 
8 County. " And signed it. 
9 That was all I left at that time. Everything else 
10 that was on this was just notes to myself. 
11 Q. Notes you made at a later time? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Okay; now, tell me how long were you here on that 
14 day on December 6/ approximately? 
15 A. Maybe half hour or 45 minutes. 
16 i Q. Tell me/ when you came/ what was said between you 
17 and the other parties? 
18 A. They said — indicated that there was some 
19 question as to the long-term or/ anyway/ the interest rate 
20 on the building whether or not the owner would-be able to 
21 get his commitment. Didn't even discuss what the interest 
22 rate was or anything but said if they could get some kind 
23 of temporary certificate or a certificate of occupancy for 
24 to show the bank/ why/ they would be able to hold interest 
25 as it was. And there would be no cost increase/ I assnmpfl. 
(Examination by Mr. DeBry) 13 
1 | Q. Now/ when they said that — was that Mr. Bartel 
2 I talking? 
3 I A. Yes. 
4 I Q. Did they say that was his personal loan or the 
5 | construction loan for the developer or did he say that was 
6 I a loan for the buyer? 
7 A. As I recall/ it was for the buyer. The long-term 
8 loan. 
9 Q. Calling your attention to the yellow notes you 
10 made on Exhibit 9 — and if you look at the last line there 
11 in red — see if that refreshes your recollection. 
12 A. His loan meaning — yeah/ I know. It says his 
13 loan was in jeopardy if he couldn't get occupancy so we 
14 gave him thirty days temporary occupancy. Well/ I still 
15 assumed that to be the long-term loan for the buyer not the 
16 builder. 
17 Q. In short/ Bartel was telling you that the loan for 
18 the buyer was in jeopardy? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Do you recall what/ if anything/ he said about any 
21 penalty? If they lost this loan, how much the penalty 
22 would be? How many points? 
23 A. No. That is why I say I don't know how much the 
24 interest was or points. I don't recall. 
25 Q. Was the conversation that thev mav lo^p t-ho i^^ 
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1 Q. Now/ when they said that — was that Mr. Bartel 
2 talking? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. Did they say that was his personal loan or the 
5 construction loan for the developer or did he say that was 
6 a loan for the buyer? 
7 A. As I recall/ it was for the buyer. The long-term 
8 loan. 
9 Q. Calling your attention to the yellow notes you 
10 made on Exhibit 9 — and if you look at the last line there 
11 in red — see if that refreshes your recollection. 
12 A. His loan meaning — yeah/ I know. It says his 
13 loan was in jeopardy if he couldn't get occupancy so we 
14 gave him thirty days temporary occupancy. Well/ I still 
15 assumed that to be the long-term loan for the buyer not the 
16 builder. 
17 Q. In short/ Bartel was telling you that the loan for 
18 the buyer was in jeopardy? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Do you recall what/ if anything/ he said about any 
21 penalty? If they lost this loan; how much the penalty 
22 would be? How many points? 
23 A. No. That is why I say I don't know how much the 
24 interest was or points. I don't recall. 
25 Q. Was the conversation that they may lose the loan 
(Examination by Mr. DeBry) 14 
1 or that it would cost more money? 
2 A. It would cost more money, 
3 Q. Okay. What was your response to that? 
4 A. Well/ at first I thought/ well I can't give you a 
5 certificate of occupancy because the building is not 
6 completed. I can give you a temporary certificate of 
7 occupancy which I did — and the ordinance backs me up — I 
8 can give a temporary occupancy for a length of time. It 
9 doesn't say how long. 
10 So I give them thirty days figuring that the 
11 problems could be completed within that time period. 
12 Q. Now/ on December 5th at the time you had this 
13 conversation — 
14 A. December 6th. 
15 Q. Sorry. December 6th. 
16 At that time did you have any plans in front of 
17 you to look at? Any approved plans? 
18 J A. No ; sir. 
19 { Q. Did you ask to look at any plans? 
20 A. I looked at his permit which he had with him and 
21 indicated to him the permit that he had was for a footing 
22 and foundation only/ and I have a copy of it here. Well/ I 
23 have the original here. 
24 Q. That is — 
25 A. That comes in what? Four copies. And that is the 
(Examination by Mr. DeBry) 15 
1 j original of the front copy of the four. 
2 (Exhibit 10 marked) 
3 Q. I show you what has been marked as Exhibit 10. Is 
4 that the document you are just talking about? The permit 
5 copy you discussed on the 6th? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Now/ when you talked on the 6th/ did you actually 
8 have Exhibit 10 in your hand? Or you had his copy? 
9 A. His copy is the hard copy. I had his. This comes 
10 in four parts. When it originally comes out/ the building 
11 gets the hard copy which/ on the back of it is the 
12 inspection and/ anyway/ the har'' °.opy is the one that he 
13 had with him and I said from what I see here/ you have 
14 nothing but a footing and foundation permit. 
15 Q. What did he say? 
16 A. I said please go to your records. I would like a 
17 copy of your records/ so send me a copy of the completed 
18 permit if you so have one. 
19 Q. What did he say? 
20 A. He indicated that the best of his knowledge he had 
21 one. Well/ he would certainly send me the copy of his file 
22 which he did. 
23 Q. When did he do that? 
24 A. February 5, 1986 with that letter. 
25 (Exhibit 11 marked) 
(Examination by Mr. DeBry) 16 
1 I Q. I show you Exhibit 11. Is this the document you 
2 referred to that he mailed to you? 
3 A. Yes. That is the cover letter. You have copies 
4 of it, and I don't remember, just really all it was was 
5 repetitions of the things I already had. In fact, he sent 
6 me copies of this. 
7 Q. When you say "this" you mean Exhibit 10? 
8 A. Yes. Some of the inspection reports, copy of 
9 Exhibit 10. The originals of those ones I had but I don't 
10 recall which ones but he sent me things I already had. So 
11 he didn't enlighten me to anything new. 
12 Q. Was there anything attached to Exhibit 11 to 
13 change your opinion that he never at any time had a 
14 building permit? 
15 A. Nothing changed my mind as far as I could tell. 
16 He still didn't have a full permit. 
17 Q. Now, with respect to Exhibit 10, let me see if I 
18 understand the procedure. Was this copy that he had of 
19 Exhibit 10, was that something that he carries around with 
20 him or is that something hanging in the building? 
21 A. That is something — well, it says it will be on 
22 hand when the inspections are made so he can keep them with 
23 him but when he calls for an inspection, it should be on 
24 the premises. If it is with him when he is on the premises, 
25 why, there is no problem with that, so that we can verify 
(Examination by Mr. DeBry) 17 
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that he has a permit. 
Q. Now; why did you issue a temporary certificate of 
occupancy when he didn't have a building permit? 
A. The only reason would be because of — I had told 
him to verify his permit. He said he had a permit and that 
we was pressed for that time period. He said it to be in 
there. I don't remember if it was 5:00 or 5:30. 
Q. Same day? 
A. The — before the bank closed that night, and 
there was no way that either one of us could verify 
anything in the short period of time. We had two or three 
hours, maybe, at the most/ and he was talking about that 
interest rate. 
So I give him the temporary certificate knowing 
that the building should have a final and would have a 
final inspection and there would be no problems with it. 
Q. Now/ on the 6th of December at the time you gave 
him the temporary certificate/ did you conduct an 
inspection of the premises? 
No, I did not. 
Q. Now/ why didn't you? 
A. Well/ Bob VanWagoner was there and told me that he 
had been — had inspected the building and my first concern 
was the set of stairs that were out in back that a truck 
25 pulled in with, and I think — which one he had first. 
(Examination by Mr. DeBry) 34 
1 process for getting a building permit in Salt Lake County? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. If I wanted to get a building permit and I didn't 
4 know anything about building/ what would I read to give me 
5 the steps? 
6 A. We have got some handout documents in the office 
7 that you could come in and pick up that would tell you the 
8 procedure. 
9 Q. But as far as the official procedure/ you follow 
10 the Uniform Building Code? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Okay. Now/ are you familiar in your job as the 
13 Building Official as to the procedure which a builder 
14 follows to get an inspection on his property? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Let's go over/ first of all/ what types of 
17 inspections are required to have a building finally 
18 approved. 
19 A. Footing/ foundation. In some instances a 
20 sub-rough plumbing which is the underground plumbing so 
21 they can pour the concrete floors/ a rough inspection of 
22 the mechanical; building, electrical and plumbing/ an 
23 insulation inspection and a final inspection. 
24 Q. Okay. 
25 A. The final inspection is building/ mechanical/ 
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1 plumbing and electrical. 
2 Q. Let's see if I got this right. Did you say an 
3 underfloor inspection? 
4 A. A sub-rough plumbing. 
5 Q. That is a sub-rough plumbing? 
6 A. Rough. 
7 Q. Did you say a frame inspection? 
8 A. Well ~ 
9 Q. Is that required? 
10 A. A framing which is rough building is the same 
11 thing. 
12 Q. Gypsum board inspections? Is that correct? 
13 A. We donft require that. 
14 Q. So what you require are the footing inspection? 
15 A. Foundation. 
16 Q. Is that the same as a footing? Foundation? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Footing is one inspection? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. Foundation is a separate inspection? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. And then a — 
23 A. Maybe a sub-rough plumbing, depends on the 
24 contractor whether or not he wants one. A lot of times 
25 that is picked up at the same time as the full rough 
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1 I plumbing inspection. That is why it can be done two ways, 
2 Q. What is meant by the term a full rough? 
3 A. When all the plumbing is installed throughout the 
4 building, all the rough plumbing, all the pipes, all the 
5 vent system is in place. 
6 Q. Then the final inspection? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Now, is there any mechanical — what about the 
9 electrical inspection? 
10 A. Well, there is the rough building electrical, 
11 mechanical and plumbing so that we call it the four roughs. 
12 Those four rough inspections are required. Then the 
13 insulation inspection. 
14 Q. I have the building, the electrical, the 
15 mechanical and what is the fourth one? 
16 A. Plumbing._ 
17 Q. Now, we had testimony this morning about 
18 electrical inspections. Can you tell by looking at your 
19 records whether any — let's talk about the building 
20 inspections. 
21 Were any footings inspections ever done on this 
22 building? 
23 A. Yes, there were. 
24 Q. Would you show me that one? 
25 A. We have two of them: one on 10-23 and one on 10-26, 
(Examination by Mr. DeBry) 37 
(Exhibits 19 and 20 marked) 
2 I Q. I show you Exhibits 19 and 20. Are these copies 
3 of the footing inspections? 
4 A. Yes, they are. 
5 J Q. Now, can you tell from your records whether any 
foundation inspection was ever done? 
7 I A. 11-13 of '84. 
8 (Exhibit 21 marked) 
9 Q. By the way, going back to Exhibits 19 and 20/ did 
10 they pass that? 
11 A. Yes. 
12 Q. Allright ,f Exhibit 21 this a copy of the foundation 
13 inspection? 
14 A. Yes, and it passed. 
15 Q. Can you tell from your records whether any rough 
16 inspection or sub-rough was done? 
17 A. Sub-rough plumbing was approved on 11-14 of '84. 
18 J (Exhibit 22 marked) 
19 Q. Is Exhibit 22 then a copy of the approval for the 
20 sub-rough? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. That is sub-rough plumbing? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Was there a sub-rough on the mechanical? 
25 A. No, not — I have no record of it. 
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1 Q. Now/ would that sub-rough 22/ did that include the 
2 building? 
3 A, That is strictly plumbing. That is underground 
4 and marked as such under there. 
5 Q. Well/ is there a time that comes that people come 
6 and look at the walls and braces? 
7 A. Yes/ that is the rough plumbing. 
8 Q. Do your notes reflect whether a full rough 
9 inspection was ever done? 
10 A. I have no record of it. 
11 Q. That is a full rough for the building or full 
12 rough for mechanical? Either of those? 
13 A. Neither one of those. 
14 Q. Do you have any record of any sub-rough or full 
15 rough for — I'm sorry. You did have a sub-rough for the 
16 plumbing. 
17 Do you have a full rough for the plumbing? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. Now/ do you have any records that we haven't 
20 talked about? 
21 A. The electrical inspector. 
22 Q. Other than the electrical? 
23 A. The electrical and I think you have — well — I 
24 don't know if you have this one or not. That wasn't Bob 
25 VanWagoner. That was Rick Warner who made that rough. 
(Examination by Mr* DeBry) 39 
That was another electrical inspector. Bob was probably 
2 | off that day so he made the inspection. 
3 i (Exhibit 23 marked) 
Q. So Exhibit 23 is another electrical inspection 
that was done? 
A. Yes. 
7 | Q. That is a sub-rough electrical? 
8 | A. Partial rough electrical. 
9 I Q. Are there any other inspections that you have 
10 | notes of? 
11 I A. I had one that was a reinspection required so he 
12 I didn't make — this was a footing inspection and that was 
13 one that didn't get made/ that was not approved. 
14 (Exhibit 24 marked) 
15 A. Then there was a 
16 Q. I show you Exhibit 24 and ask you to tell me what 
17 that is? 
18 A. Footing inspection that was not approved. 
19 Q. Does it say why it was not approved? 
20 A. It just says reinspection required. Evidently/ it 
21 was not ready. 
22 Q. "Was it ever redone? 
23 A. Well/ these other two would have. 
24 Q. 19 and 20? 
25 A. These other two would have covered it. 20 
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1 probably. The 26th. This — as you notice, he put down 
2 west end north side one-third of building and... 
3 Q. Do you know that that means? 
4 A. Evidently that was the portion that he was to look 
5 at and it wasn't ready. Then on 10-26 — yeah — it was 
6 requested again and I assume that is the same one because 
7 Ralph Reynolds approved that one. 
8 Q. Okay. So my question is: are there any other 
9 inspections — 
10 A. There was a stop work order put on because of the 
11 flood control impact fee check that was returned to our 
12 office. And, consequently, I don't know what happened with 
13 that, you know, whether or not that was ever verified or 
14 resubmitted or what. 
15 (Exhibit 25 marked) 
16 Q. I show you Exhibit 25 and ask you to tell us what 
17 that is. 
18 A. A stop work order as per flood control and I have 
19 no idea what really what it was for. Ifm assuming it was 
20 because of the check but I don't really know. 
21 Q. Who signed it there? 
22 A. Deceased inspector so I canft even ask him what he 
23 looked at. He past away a couple of two years ago. 
24 Q. Do you know if the stop work order has ever been 
25 lifted? 
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1 A* I don't know. He is probably the only one that 
2 can tell me. 
3 Q. How is a stop order lifted? 
4 A. By the person that put it on. 
5 Q. You have no record of it having been lifted? 
6 A. I have no record of that. 
7 Q. My question is different: you have no written 
8 notification that the stop work order has ever been lifted? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Just to summarize — I want to summarize the 
11 inspections that were not done as I understand it. There 
12 has never been, well/ there has never been a final 
13 inspection of any kind; is that correct? 
14 A. Not according to my records there hasn't. 
15 Q. Okay. 
16 A. That was going to be the case with every one of 
17 your questions if you ask them that way. 
18 Q. Well/ there has never been a full rough inspection 
19 on the building or the electrical or the mechanical or the 
20 plumbing; is that correct? 
21 A. Not as far as I know. 
22 Q. As far as a sub-rough inspection/ we did find one 
23 for plumbing but nothing for mechanical or electrical or 
24 the building; is that correct? 
25 A. Well/ you did have some/ well/ sub-rough now. 
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1 Q. Sub-rough? I found one for plumbing? 
2 A. Right. 
3 Q. Nothing for mechanical. 
4 A. Oh/ yeah. 
5 Q. Nothing for mechanical and nothing for the 
6 building? 
7 A. Right. Yes. 
8 Q. What is the cost of a building permit? Is it only 
9 $74.00? 
10 A. Based on the square foot valuation of the building/ 
11 it is indicated in Chapter 3 of the Building Code. Once 
12 the valuation is made up/ a thousand square foot building — 
13 and it is just using some numbers here — if it is a 
14 thousand square foot/ it would cost $20.00 a square foot 
15 times the — twenty times the thousand and come up with a 
16 fee or a number and put it into the fee schedule in Chapter 
17 3 of the Building Code which tells you how much the 
18 building permit itself is. 
19 Q. Do you know if anyone has ever determined the 
20 amount of the fee for the building permit? 
21 A. Yes. It is on the front part of Exhibit Number 12. 
22 Q. Show me. 
23 A. Right up here on the right. 
24 Q. So the building permit fee is $1/075? 
25 A. Yes. 
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A. Yes. 
2 I Q. Did you ever get a response to Exhibit 27? 
3 A. This letter number? 
4 Q. 11. 
5 A. Numbered Exhibit 11. 
6 Q. Now/ during these conversations was anything said 
7 between you and Mr. Thurgood on the subject of whether or 
8 not they had a building permit? 
9 A. Well/ again/ if I did/ I would have just told them 
10 that as far as my records were concerned/ we had no permit. 
11 Q. As I recall your earlier testimony/ it was that 
12 when you came here/ they showed you a piece of paper that 
13 was only a footing and foundation permit? 
14 A. Yes. I mean that is all I had was a footing and 
15 foundation but no full permit. 
16 Q. Did I understand correctly/ did he tell you that 
17 he thought he had a full permit somewhere at home? 
18 A. Yes, he did. If he didn't/ Mr. Bartel did. So... 
19 Q. Tell me as nearly as you can his exact words on 
20 that subject as nearly as you can recall. 
21 A. I really — 
22 Q. In substance. 
23 A. Well/ as far as I could tell and recall/ he said 
24 I'm sure we have got the permit. 
25 Q. Did you, after that/ go back to the office that 
(Examination by Mr. DeBry) 51 
1 I night or the next day or the next day and look to see what 
2 I your office records showed? 
3 | A. Well/ I don't remember when that conversation was. 
4 I Sometime/ yes7 we looked to see what records we got. 
5 Q. You had a conversation to that effect on the 6th 
6 of December. Isn't that when he assured — 
7 A. Yes, after that/ yes, yes. Well/ I don!t know if 
8 I had had a conversation with him on the 6th of December 
9 but very shortly after I did. Yes. 
10 Q. Isn't the 6th of December when he showed you his 
11 Exhibit 10? 
12 A. Mr. Bartel did. 
13 Q. Mr. Bartel? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. After Mr. Bartel showed you Exhibit 10, and 
16 assured you that he had another full building permit 
17 somewhere else, did you go back and look at your records? 
18 A. Yes, we started searching for them. 
19 Q. How long after the 6th of December did you conduct 
20 a search? 
21 A. The next day. We found — didn't find anything. 
22 Q. What did you do when you didn't find anything the 
23 next day? 
24 A. Well, that is when I started the procedure of 
25 trying to get ahold of somebody. 
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1 Q. Anything else you did? 
2 A. No. 
3 Q. So when you couldnft get the building permit the 
4 next day/ eventually you mailed Exhibit 27; is that correct? 
5 A. Yes/ that is right. 
6 Q. Well/ did you do anything in between December 7, 
7 when you looked at your records and couldn't find the 
8 building permit/ and January 14? 
9 A. I don't recall what I did. I don't have anything 
10 in writing anyway. 
11 Q. Now/ we were talking about inspections earlier and 
12 there are some inspections that had never been done. Is it 
13 possible at this point with the building in the stage you 
14 see it done/ to go back and do those inspections? Is it 
15 possible to do a full rough inspection? 
16 A. For all practical purposes/ I would say/ yes/ I 
17 have already done that. 
18 Q. You looked behind the walls? 
19 A. Well/ not behind the walls but as far as what is 
20 meant by the term between the ceiling and the floors above/ 
21 why/ you can get a good idea of what is meant by the term 
22 going on with a building. 
23 Q. Okay. You were able to do a portion or a part of 
24 it? 
25 A. Yes. 
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IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and 
JOAN DEBRY, 
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CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general 
partnership; DEL K. BARTEL; 
DALE THURGOOD; ROBERT G. HILL; 
UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT CO.; 
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION, a 
general partnership; LEE 
ALLEN BARTEL; SALMON AND 
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SAWYER GLASS CO., INC.; 
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VALLEY MORTGAGE CORP., INC.; 
RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE 
CORP.; WALLACE R. NOBLE, 
individually and in his 
official capacity; SALT LAKE 
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Defendants Salt Lake County and Wallace Ray Noble respond 
to plaintiffs' Request for Admissions and Interrogatory as 
follows: 
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DEFENDANTS' SALT LAKE 
COUNTY AND WALLACE RAY 
NOBLE RESPONSES TO 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST REQUEST 
FOR ADMISSIONS AND 
INTERROGATORY 
Civil No. C86-553 
Judge Richard Moffat 
RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR ADMISSION 
REQUEST NO. 1: Admit that the stop work order affecting 
the building at 4252 South 700 East (Exhibit 34 to Noble 
deposition) has never at any time been withdrawn, lifted or 
revoked. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 2: Admit that Cascade Enterprises and/or 
Cascade Construction constructed the building at 4252 South 700 
East in violation of a valid stop work order, and that the stop 
work order has never been lifted or revoked. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 3: Admit that no final building permit was 
ever issued to Cascade Construction and/or Cascade Enterprises 
for the building at 4252 South 700 East. 
RESPONSE: Admit. 
REQUEST NO. 4: Admit that neither Cascade Enterprises nor 
Cascade Construction ever obtained any "approved plans" for the 
building at 4252 South 700 East as required by Section 2-1-1, 
Salt Lake County Ordinances of January 14, 1983 (Uniform 
Building Code §303(a). 
RESPONSE: Admit, but see Answer to Interrogatory. 
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY 
With respect to any response to the foregoing request for 
admissions which is anything other than an unqualified 
affirmative, describe in reasonable detail the factual basis 
for your denial. 
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ANSWER: Salt Lake County, however, did approve plans 
submitted to it for the construction of the footings and 
foundation of the building located at 4252 South 700 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on November 16, 1984. 
DATED th] day of December, 1986. 
DEFENDANTS SALT LAKE COUNTY AND 
WALLACE RAY NOBLE 
Bv m^<?£. cr 
WALLACE RAY NOBLE 
is ^ SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me th 
December, 1986. 
day of 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC, Residing in 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
Defendants' Salt Lake County and Wallace Ray Noble Responses to 
Plaintiffs' First Request., for Admissions and Interrogatory, 
postage prepaid. this A/J-n day of December, 1986, to the 
following: 
Robert B. Hansen 
325 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
Robert J. DeBry 
Robert J. DeBry & Associates 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Jeffrey K. Woodbury 
Walter Kennedy III 
WOODBURY, BETTILYON AND KESLER 
2677 East Parley's Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
George A. Hunt 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark A. Larson 
DART, ADAMSON & PARKEN 
310 South Main Street, #1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Jeff Silvestrini 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Steven R. McMurray 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON 
The Hermes Building 
455 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
D. Michael Nielsen 
Session Place 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
-4-
Valden Livingston 
PARSONS. BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
1021G 
-5-
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Acting Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: Paul G. Maughan (No. 2124) 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Salt Lake County Defendants 
and Wallace R. Noble 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and 
JOAN DEBRY. 
Plaintiffs, 
_vs-
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general 
partnership; DEL K. BARTEL; 
DALE THURGOOD; ROBERT G. HILL; 
UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT CO.; 
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION, a 
general partnership; LEE 
ALLEN BARTEL; SALMON AND 
ALDER, INC.; WILLIAM TRIGGER 
d.b.a. TRIGGER ROOFING; 
ZEPHYR ELECTRIC. INC.; 
SAWYER GLASS CO.. INC.; 
TRIAD SERVICES CO.. INC.; 
VALLEY MORTGAGE CORP., INC.; 
RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE 
CORP.; WALLACE R. NOBLE, 
individually and in his 
official capacity; SALT LAKE 
COUNTY WORKS DEPT.; SALT 
LAKE COUNTY; SCOTT MCDONALD 
REALTY. INC.; and, STANLEY 
POSTMA, 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule III of the Rules of Practice in the Third 
Judicial District Court for the District of Utah, Paul G. 
FILE C0P\ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Civil No. C86-553 
Judge Richard Moffat 
Maughan, attorney for defendants Salt Lake County and Wallace 
Ray Noble, hereby certifies that the original of Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Admissions and Interrogatory, and this 
Certificate of Service were mailed, postage prepaid, 
this, U day of December, 1986, to the following: 
Robert B. Hansen 
325 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
Robert J. DeBry 
Robert J. DeBry & Associates 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
The undersigned further certifies that true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Response and this Certificate of 
Service were mailed, postage prepaid, this V day of 
December, 1986, to the following: 
Jeffrey K. Woodbury 
Walter Kennedy III 
WOODBURY. BETTILYON AND KESLER 
2677 East Parley's Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
George A. Hunt 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark A. Larson 
DART, ADAMSON & PARKEN 
310 South Main Street, #1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Jeff Silvestrini 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Steven R". McMurray 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON 
The Hermes Building 
455 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
D. Michael Nielsen 
Session Place 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Valden Livingston 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Acting Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: Paul G. Maughan (No. 2124) 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants Salt Lake County 
and Wallace R. Noble 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Telephone: 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and 
JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general 
partnership; DEL K. BARTEL; 
DALE THURGOOD; ROBERT G. HILL; 
UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT CO.; 
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION, a 
general partnership; LEE 
ALLEN BARTEL; SALMON AND 
ALDER. INC.; WILLIAM TRIGGER 
d.b.a. TRIGGER ROOFING; 
ZEPHYR ELECTRIC. INC.; 
SAWYER GLASS CO.. INC.; 
TRIAD SERVICES CO.. INC.; 
VALLEY MORTGAGE CORP., INC.; 
RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE 
CORP.; WALLACE R. NOBLE, 
individually and in his 
official capacity; SALT LAKE 
COUNTY WORKS DEPT.; SALT 
LAKE COUNTY; SCOTT MCDONALD 
REALTY, INC.; and, STANLEY 
POSTMA, 
Defendants. 
Defendants Salt Lake County and Wallace R. Noble answer 
Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories as follows: 
DEFENDANTS SALT LAKE 
COUNTY'S AND WALLACE R. 
NOBLE'S ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFFS' FIRST INTERRO-
GATORIES 
Civil No. C86-553 
Judge Richard Moffat 
FILE COPY 
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Identify each conversation which you 
have had with any partners, officers, agents or employees of 
Cascade Construction and/or Cascade Enterprises on the subject 
of obtaining "approved plans" for the building at 4252 South 
700 East as required by Section 2-1-1, Salt Lake County 
Ordinances of January 14, 1983, and Section 303(a) of the 
Uniform Building Code. 
ANSWER: I have spoken to Del Bartel on at least four 
occasions, twice at the site, once during a deposition, and 
twice at his office at 715 East 3900 South. I have spoken 
three times to Dale Thurgood on the phone. The essence of each 
conversation was that I told them to get a building permit. In 
order to get a permit, the building plans must be approved. 
I do not recall any specific dates or times, or who was 
present on those occasions. I believe, however, I spoke to 
Bartel on December 6, 7, 1984 and at my first deposition taken 
by Mr. DeBry. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: Identify each document sent to or 
received from Cascade Construction, Cascade Enterprises, or any 
of their partners, officers, agents, or employees on the 
subject of obtaining "approved plans" as required by Section 
2-1-1, Salt Lake County Ordinances of January 14, 1983, and 
Section 303(a) of the Uniform Building Code. 
ANSWER: 
(a) On January 14 a letter was sent to Cascade 
Construction to inform them they had only received a footing 
_9_ 
and foundation permit and they would have to comply with the 
necessary requirements. See Deposition Exhibit 27. 
(b) A letter was received from Cascade Construction 
February 11, 1986, explaining their reasons, in answer to my 
January 14th letter, for noncompliance. See Deposition Exhibit 
11. 
(c) A letter was received from Cascade Construction in 
February, 1986 explaining why a check was enclosed for a permit 
fee of $1,075.00. See Deposition Exhibit 26. 
(d) A letter dated March 19, 1986 was sent by Ray Noble to 
Del Bartel and Robert DeBry listing some of the problems found 
after Mr. DeBry asked if an inspection would be made on his 
building which included that a permit was required. See 
Deposition Exhibit 33. 
(e) On October 2, 1986, I received a letter from Cascade 
Construction stating they had complied with the requirements of 
the March 19th letter. See letter attached. 
On the original plan check list a note was made that 
plumbing, mechanical and electrical plans were to be 
submitted. See Deposition Exhibit 12. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Identify each conversation which you 
have had with any partners, officers, agents or employees of 
Cascade Construction and/or Cascade Enterprises on the subject 
of obtaining a building permit as required by Section 2-1-1, 
Salt Lake County Ordinances of January 14, 1983, and Section 
301(a) of the Uniform Building Code. 
ANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory No. 1. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify each document sent to or 
received from Cascade Construction and/or Cascade Enterprises 
or any of their partners, officers, agents, or employees on the 
subject of obtaining a building permit as required by Section 
2-1-1, Salt lake County Ordinances of January 14, 1983, and 
Section 301(a) of the Uniform Building Code. 
ANSWER: See answer to Interrogatory No. 2. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Identify each conversation which you 
have had with any partners, officers, agents or employees of 
Cascade Construction and/or Cascade Enterprises on the subject 
of issuing, receiving, enforcing, or revoking a stop work order. 
ANSWER: None. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 6: Identify each document sent to or 
received from Cascade Construction and/or Cascade Enterprises 
on the subject of issuing, receiving, enforcing, or revoking a 
stop work order. 
ANSWER: On November 29, 1984, a letter was sent to Cascade 
Construction stating tha if the check for $2,677.67 was not 
made good by December 7, 1984, a Stop Work would be placed on 
the development. See letter attached. A Stop Work Order was 
placed on the job by Robert Ferguson on December 18, 1984. See 
Deposition Exhibit 25. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Describe each inspection conducted by 
any Salt Lake County agent or employee on the building at 4252 
South 700 East with respect to each such inspection state: 
(a) Why the inspection was conducted by request; 
(b) By whom the inspection was conducted; 
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(c) When the inspection was conducted; 
(d) Purpose of the inspection; 
(e) Identify any conversation which occurred during the 
course of the construction; 
(f) The findings of the inspection; 
(g) Whether the inspectors viewed the approved plans, the 
inspection card, and the permit in connection with the 
inspection and if not why not; 
(h) Identify each document which relates to each such 
inspection. 
ANSWER: 
(a) Footing inspection - Ralph Reynolds - 10-23-84. 
To check for any problems in the work being done. 
Work was approved for south and east section. 
(b) Footing inspection - Jerry Hansen - 10-24-84. 
To check for any problems in the work being done. 
A reinspection was called for. 
(c) Spot footing - Ralph Reynolds - 10-26-84. 
To check for any problems in the work being done. 
Work was approved. 
(d) Foundation inspection - Ralph Reynolds - 11-13-84. 
To check for any problems in the work being done. 
Work approved. 
(e) Sub rough plumbing or underground - Stan Hansen. 
To check for any problems in the work being done. 
Work approved. 
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(f) Rough electrical - Rick Werner - 9-16-85. 
To check for any problems in the work being done. 
Work approved. 
(g) Rough electrical - Bob Van Wagoner - 9-24-85. 
To check for any problems in the work being done, 
(h) Rough electrical - Bob Van Wagoner - 11-7-85. 
To check for any problems in the work being done. 
Work checked incomplete. 
Needed to be grounded to main cold water pipe. 
Needed to sign for power-to-panel, 
(i) Rough electrical - Bob Van Wagoner 11-18-85. 
To check for any problems in the work being done. 
Work approved, 
(j) Partial final building, electrical, plumbing & 
mechanical 0 Bob Van Wagoner - 12-6-85. 
To check for any problems in the work being done. 
Work approved subject to the following: 
Will need to check with Ray Noble for building 
clearance. 
Plumbing - 2 sinks to be completed. 
Heating - completed except grills. 
Building - back stairs from the top foor to be 
installed on west side outside. 
Electrical - Completed except 4 overhead lights and 
breakers on order, to be installed. 
Subject to all permits. 
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Subject to Zoning & Conditional Use. 
Landscaping to be completed. 
(k) All inspections were made upon the request of the 
builder. 
(1) No specific conversations can be recalled that took 
place, if any, at the time these inspections were 
performed. 
(m) No plans were ever approved other than for footings 
and foundation; the inspection card was available at 
the site; it is not known if it was at all times 
viewed on the site; no permit was ever issued other 
than a footings and foundation permit so they were 
obviously not present on the site. 
(n) Inspection documents relating to inspections made of 
the building have previously been given to plaintiffs 
as exhibits to Mr. Noble's deposition. Numbered 
exhibits 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 19, 20, 23, and 25. In 
addition, the following three inspection reports are 
produced herewith and constitute the total inspection 
reports of the County in this matter. Any further 
information desired by plaintiffs is equally available 
to them by reviewing said documents. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: State why no further inspections 
(other than those described in No. 7 above) were accomplished. 
ANSWER: They were not called for. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Describe in reasonable detail each 
reason why the stop work order (Exhibit 34 to the Noble 
deposition) was not enforced. 
ANSWER: The stop work order was issued because required 
flood impact fees had not been paid. No follow-up was ever 
instigated by the building inspectors. 
INTERROG ATOR Y NO. 10: On Page 51 and 52 of the Noble 
deposition, defendant Noble testified that the day after the 
temporary certificate of occupancy (Exhibit 34 to Noble 
deposition) was issued, Mr. Noble determined that no building 
permit had ever been issued to Cascade Construction. State 
each reason why the temporary certificate of occupancy was not 
immediately withdrawn or revoked at that time. 
ANSWER: At the time of issuance I was told by Del Bartel 
that the building would be finished in the 30 days. The 
issuance of a permit and the completion of the building could 
have been done in that time so no reason for withdrawing of or 
revoking was presented until a later date when problems became 
apparent. 
DATED this H day of December, 1986. 
WALLACE R. NOBLE for himself 
and on behalf of Salt Lake 
County 
WALLACE R. NOBLE 
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STATE OF UTAH 
County of Salt Lake 
ss 
WALLACE R. NOBLE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and says: That he has read the foregoing Answers to Plain-
tiffs' First Interrogatories and declares that they are true to 
the best of his knowledge, information and belief. 
si 
'/Oaz 
WALLACE R. NOBLE 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me th 
December, 1986. 
is V* day of 
My Commission Expires: 
8^-90 
1041G 
"~/<Juh> tzJ&fctfttu 
NOTARY PUBLIC, Residing in 
Sa l t Lake County, Utah 
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OBJECTION TO DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS 
Defendants, by and through their attorney of record, object 
to the definitions and instructions contained in plaintiffs' 
first interrogatories to defendants on the ground that they are 
overly broad, burdensom, oppressive and call for unnecessary 
detail which goes beyond the plaintiffs' legitimate needs of 
discovery in this action. 
Defendants have nevertheless answered said interrogatories 
as completely, openly, and fully as possible. Any information 
not given as requested is because defendants have no recollec-
tion of additional information regarding the subject in 
question, or because business records have previously been 
furnished or are herewith .furnished and additional information 
based upon them is equally available to or ascertainable by 
plaintiffs. j 
DATED this O day of December, 1986. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
By. 
PAUL G. MAUGHAtf t) 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Salt Lake County and 
Wallace R. Noble 
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CASCADE ENTERPRISES 
715 East 3900 South, Suite #212 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
September 11, 1986 
Salt lake County Public Works 
Development Service Division 
Mr. Wallace R. Noble 
2035 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Dear Mr. Noble: 
RE: Office Building - 4252 South State 
I am writing this letter in an effort to end our involvement 
with the above referenced project. In your letter of March 19, 1986 
you addressed a series of punch list items that needed to be completed. 
I will endevor to address these itens in the same order as you listed 
them. 
1. Handicap hardware has been installed and completed in 
accordance with county code. 
2. We have been informed by DeBry that any partitions he 
is willing to accept have been installed by his firm. 
3. All fixtures have been sealed at point of contact with 
walls and floors. 
4. All ceiling tiles are installed and in place. 
5. All electrical junction boxes have had the appropriate 
cover plates installed. 
6. The exterior air conditioner units have been installed 
and completed by Sanon and Alder and have been fully 
operational all summer. 
7. There are no roof leaks or water leaks that have not been 
repaired. Ihere is no water leakage of any sort of which 
we are aware. 
8. All stairways both interior and exterior are anchored and 
complete to the extent we were allowed to complete the 
work prior to having our people ordered off the job (see 
attached statement frcm Kerry McQueen). 
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9. The main stairs in the foyer are in fact 12f8" in rise 
and the 8" variance was checked by Gil Claderen and 
approved and initialed as accepted by Jay Bishop. 
10. All footings of the building are covered and protected 
with back fill. 
11. The window on the east side of the building was installed 
by Sawyer Glass Company and inspected by a Salt Lake 
County inspector and passed as being appropriately 
installed. 
12. The suspended ceiling has not been anchored other than 
as originally installed by Building Systems. We attempted 
to access the ceiling for additonal work and was denied 
access by Mr. DeBry. 
13. The light fixtures have not been reanchored due to the 
fact that the electrician was ordered off the job by 
Mr. DeBry. Written verification by Zepher Electric 
can by supplied upon request. 
14. We attempted to install draft stops between the floor 
and ceiling and the ceiling and the roof and our sub, 
John Swaney was ordered off the project by Mr. DeBry. 
Letter attached. 
15. & 16. Our engineer, Mr. Stan Postman of Bingham Engineering 
assures us that all items are complete as called for and 
will supply you any information you require directly. 
17. We have installed all bolts in girder saddles as required. 
18. Electrical sub breaker branch panels have been installed 
per instructions frcm Salt Lake County officials. 
19. All grading and landscape has been completed and accepted 
by Salt Lake County and DOT. 
20. The fence has been anchored and installation completed. 
21. Drive approach, curb, gutter, sidewalk and combination 
box has been completed and accepted by Salt Lake County 
and DOT. 
22. The front foyer was built and delivered for installation 
as per plans and specs by Sawyer Glass. Upon delivery 
DeBrys1 rejected the foyer and insisted on redesigning 
the foyer to their own specs. 
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23. Please see items 15 and 16. 
24. The plans were completed and the building built according 
to corrected plans. The County should have these in their 
files. We are here with including the as builts on elect-
rical layout and floor and wall plans. 
25. The on site and off site improvements were bonded as 
required. These improvements have since been completed 
and a release of bond requested. 
26. We originally filled out and completed a permit application. 
We have furnished a copy of this application to the County 
which also included the signatures of County officials. We 
have paid all fees to all departments of the County as 
requested for the insurance of permits through all phases 
of the permit process. It was never our intension or 
understanding that WB were building without a permit. 
At this point in time we feel we have done everything humanly 
possible to comply with every request made by Salt Lake County and are 
herewith asking for a release frcm our responsibility regarding any 
further permits or certificates of occupancy. 
Sincerely 
^ ^ - - ^ ^ 1 ^ 
Dale" Thurgood ^s 
DT:leh 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT 
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES DIVISION 
2033 South State 
Salt .Lake City, Utah 84115 
Phone: 535-7511 
November 2 9 , 19 84 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
C a s c a d e C o n s t r u c t i o n 
3 0 1 W e s t 5400 S o u t h 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 84107 
G e n t l e m e n : 
COMMISSIONER 
BART BARKER 
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS 
DONALD G.SPENCER 
Professional Engineer 
County Engineer 
DIRECTOR 
KEN JONES 
SUBJECT: Returned Check #10 89 (Development Impact Fee, 
Plaza Office Building, Receipt #117490) PL-83-2124 
Gentlemen: 
On October 19, 19 84, your check in the amount of $2,677,67 
was returned to Salt Lake County by United Bank. (Copy attachec 
This check was received as payment for the development impact 
fee assessed to your project, the Plaza Office Building at 
4240 South 700 East. 
Mrs. Lucille Reese, Building Inspection Cashier, has contacted 
your office several times to request that the check be re-
placed. To date she has had no response to her request. 
Therefore, be advised by receipt of this letter, that unless 
we receive a Cashier's Check in the sum of $2,6 82.67 
($2,677.67 payment for impact fee, plus $5.00 returned check 
fee) by December 7, 19 84, a stop-work order will be issued 
by Salt Lake County on your development. 
We are most anxious to settle this matter and avoid delays to 
your project. Please contact Lucille Reese at 488-5000, at 
your earliest convenience, to resolve this issue. 
Yours truly, 
£Uix» 
L. Brent Tidweil 
Engineering Section Administrator 
LBT/ckc 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Acting Salt Lake County Attorney 
By: Paul G. Maughan (No. 2124) 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorneys for Salt Lake County Defendants 
and Wallace R. Noble 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 363-7900 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY and 
JOAN DEBRY, 
Plaintiffs, 
_vs-
CASCADE ENTERPRISES, a general 
partnership; DEL K. BARTEL; 
DALE THURGOOD; ROBERT G. HILL; 
UTAH TITLE AND ABSTRACT CO.; 
CASCADE CONSTRUCTION, a 
general partnership; LEE 
ALLEN BARTEL; SALMON AND 
ALDER. INC.; WILLIAM TRIGGER 
d.b.a. TRIGGER ROOFING; 
ZEPHYR ELECTRIC, INC.; 
SAWYER GLASS CO., INC.; 
TRIAD SERVICES CO.. INC.; 
VALLEY MORTGAGE CORP.. INC.; 
RICHARDS-WOODBURY MORTGAGE 
CORP.; WALLACE R. NOBLE, 
individually and in his 
official capacity; SALT LAKE 
COUNTY WORKS DEPT.; SALT 
LAKE COUNTY; SCOTT MCDONALD 
REALTY. INC.; and. STANLEY 
POSTMA. 
Defendants. 
Pursuant to Rule III of the Rules of Practice in the Third 
Judicial District Court for the District of Utah. Paul G. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Civil No. C86-553 
Judge Richard Moffat 
Maughanr attorney for defendants Salt Lake County and Wallace 
Ray Noble, hereby certifies that the original of Defendants 
Salt Lake County's and Wallace R. Noble's Answers to 
Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories, and this Certificate of 
Service were mailed, postage prepaid, this / day of 
December, 1986, to the following: 
Robert B. Hansen 
325 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
Robert J. DeBry 
Robert J. DeBry & Associates 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
The undersigned further certifies that true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Answers and this Certificate of Service 
were mailed, postage prepaid, this / day of December, 1986, 
to the following: 
Jeffrey K. Woodbury 
Walter Kennedy III 
WOODBURY, BETTILYON AND KESLER 
2677 East Parley's Way 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
George A. Hunt 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark A. Larson 
DART, ADAMSON & PARKEN 
310 South Main Street, #1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Jeff Silvestrini 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
66 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
-2-
Steven R. McMurray 
McMURRAY, McMURRAY, DALE & PARKINSON 
The Hermes Building 
455 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
D. Michael Nielsen 
Session Place 
505 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Valden Livingston 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street, #700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
1041G 
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1 | A. I donft remember saying that. 
2 I Q. Would that have been the normal practice of the 
3 department? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Since 1980 are you aware of any other 
6 commercial building in Salt Lake County where a 
7 temporary certificate of occupancy has been issued 
8 without a building permit? 
9 I A. No. 
10 Q. Are you aware of that ever having occurred? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Are you aware of any other building other than 
13 this building in Salt Lake County where a temporary 
14 certificate of occupancy has been issued during the 
15 period in which a stop work order was in effect? 
16 A. No. 
17 Q. Are you aware of any other commercial building 
18 in Salt Lake County where a temporary certificate of 
19 occupancy has been issued without the required 
20 I inspections having been performed? 
21 I A. No. 
22 I Q. Is it the usual procedure of your department or 
23 | was it the usual procedure in 1984 and 1985, 1986, once 
24 | a temporary certificate of occupancy was given, to allow 
25 | the occupier of the building to continue to occupy the 
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building while the necessary completion items are 
finished? 
A* That would be the normal procedure, yes. 
Q. Since 1980 are you aware of any commercial 
building in Salt Lake County where a temporary 
certificate of occupancy has been given and occupancy 
has been allowed where a notice to vacate has been given 
prior to a permanent certificate of occupancy being 
issued? 
A. No. 
Q. Are you aware in your total tenure with the 
county of that ever having occurred? 
A. No. 
Q. Did your department in 1984 and 1985 have 
specific written policies with respect to when and under 
what circumstances a notice to vacate would be given? 
A. No. 
Q. Would that be your decision at that time, !84 
and !85? 
A. Yes. 
Q. After the administrative changes that were made 
in the beginning of 1986, did you still have that 
authority? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you be the person who would be 
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Q. Would there be any situations other than 
imminent life threatening situations which would cause 
you to issue a notice to vacate? 
A. I don't know what you're alluding to. 
Q. Well, you've said that if there's a life 
threatening, imminent life threatening, danger you would 
issue a notice to vacate? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What I'm wondering is are there any situations 
other than an imminent life threatening situation 
wherein you would issue a notice to vacate as opposed to 
just allowing the repairs to be made while they were in 
the building? 
A. I would believe it would be situations like no 
response to requests for permits, monies that are owed, 
those things where a person is not answering our 
requests so it would be against our policy to allow them 
to stay in the building when in fact they really don't 
have a permit and I haven't got a certificate of 
occupancy. 
Q. And were taking no steps to get them? 
A. Yes, they're taking no steps so we ask them to 
vacate. 
Q. Would that normally be handled with a notice to 
vacate or would you give them some sort of a warning 
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saying if you don't do something by a certain date you 
would do that? 
A. I would think we would give them the warning. 
Q. Was any such warning given in this case? 
A. Not that I'm aware of. 
Q. In this case, was the so-called -- well, we'll 
refer to them as the life threatening situations, 
whatever they were -- were they the reasons why the 
notice to vacate was given? 
A. I do believe, yes. 
Q. And were they the only reasons? 
A. As far as I can remember, yes. 
Q. At least in your mind there weren't any other 
reasons? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, what would you define as a life 
threatening imminent danger? 
A. Oh, maybe a truss that's broken, the case of a 
roof collapse, floor joist problems, electrical 
hazards. I don't know. Numerous things. 
Q. Is it the normal policy of the county to make 
their own inspections with respect to whether or not 
there are life threatening situations? 
A. Not always, no. 
Q. Have you other than in this situation ever 
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relied on in issuing that notice to vacate? 
A. Well, I didn't do it so I don't really know. 
Q. Did you have any input into it? 
A. No. 
Q. None at all? 
A. No. 
Q. You never discussed it with Mr. Eriksson? 
A. Yes, I'm sure we discussed it. I don't 
remember what we discussed. 
Q. So you don't know what they were? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you make a recommendation to him on whether 
or not that notice to vacate should issue? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Did you give an opinion to him in any way with 
respect to any of the supposed life threatening 
conditions? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Having reviewed the file, are you aware of any 
conditions which you would consider life threatening? 
A. No. 
Q. Would you consider it an extreme situation to 
evict someone from a building after issuing a temporary 
certificate and prior to the final being issued? 
A. Would you repeat that? 
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Q. I believe you testified that in your twenty 
some odd years with Salt Lake County you have never been 
aware of another situation in which a temporary 
certificate was issued and the occupier was then evicted 
prior to the issuance of the final, is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So this building is the only time you've ever 
done that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the only time you've ever been aware that 
it' s ever been done? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the normal procedure is to just allow the 
occupier to make whatever repairs are necessary, is that 
correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in order to do that would it be necessary 
for the county to tell the occupier what repairs they 
required in order for a certificate to issue? 
A. I don't remember the extenuating circumstances 
why we refused, but if the same situation was to arise 
again I'm sure we'd handle it the same way. We wouldn't 
select one person over another to do that. 
MR. WELLS: Well, that's not the question. 
Would you read back the question to him. 
E X H I B I T - G 
(Examination by Mr. Wells) 40 
A. I!m not aware of any other cases. 
Q. Other than the building in which we are 
presently sitting, are you aware of any cases where a 
temporary certificate of occupancy has been issued, and 
subsequent to the issuance' of that temporary certificate 
it has been discovered that there was no building permit 
prior to the issuance of that certificate other than for 
footings and foundations? 
A. I donft know of any other such case. 
Q. Other than the building at which we are 
located at 4252 South 700 East, are you aware of any 
case in which a temporary certificate of occupancy has 
been issued between the time you came on in 1933 and 
January of 1988, being the period when ihe temporary 
certificate was issued, wherein the owners of the 
building have been required to vacate the building prior 
to the issuance of the final certificate of occupancy? 
A. I'm not aware of any other such cases. 
Q. During the period 1983 to the present, are you 
aware of any cases where a temporary certificate of 
occupancy has been issued and the final certificate of 
occupancy has not been issued within the time period set 
in the temporary certificate? 
A. I!m not aware of any. 
Q. Would it be fair to say then that this 
NED A. GRZENIG - CAPITOL REPORTERS 
(Examination by Mr. Wells) 41 
building at 4252 South 700 East is a one of a kind 
situation as far as your experience with the department? 
A. It is. 
Q. Did the county revoke the temporary 
certificate of occupancy issued on this building in 
December of 1985? 
A. No. 
Q. That's never been revoked? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, you read to us a procedure out of the 
building code. Has that procedure been followed with 
respect to this building? 
A. I believe it has. 
Q. Tell us in what manner that procedure was 
followed. 
A. The temporary certificate expired after 30 
days. There was no certificate of occupancy en this 
building subsequent to zne expiration of "Che temporary 
certificate of occupancy and so there was no revocation 
required. 
Q. Do you know when that certificate expired? 
A. I don't know the exact date. 
Q. Thirty days from issuance? 
A. Yes, 30 days from issuance. 
Q. So that would have been sometime in January of 
NED A. GREENIG - CAPITOL REPORTERS 
(Examination by Mr. Wells) 42 
1986? 
A. January or February, I don't remember the 
exact dates. 
Q. When did the county discover that there was no 
building permit on this building other than footings and 
foundations? 
A. I think it was discovered -- I don't have 
personal knowledge of that. 
Q. Does the county have any documents or records 
that you're aware of that would indicate when that was 
discovered? 
A. No, not that I'm aware of. 
Q. Other than the temporary certificate of 
occupancy that was issued in December of 1985, to your 
knowledge, prior to January of 1987 did the county ever 
issue any other type of certificate of occupancy, 
temporary or permanent, for this property to any person? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Now, with respect to the requirements for the 
issuance of temporary and permanent certificates of 
occupancy, I believe you've stated that prior to a 
building permit being issued all of the zoning has to be 
taken care of and in order, is that correct? 
A. Usually. 
Q. Was that the case prior to 1986? 
NED A. GREENIG - CAPITOL REPORTERS 
(Examination by Mr. Wells) 43 
A. Ifm not sure. Well, it was the case prior to 
1986, yes. 
Q. Did you have policies and procedures in place 
which, to your knowledge, would cause those requirements 
to be verified prior to the issuance of a certificate of 
occupancy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would you tell me what those policies and 
procedures were? 
A. Again they were for the most part oral. But 
they did involve the review of the file by the 
dispatcher to see to it that -- let me back up a 
little. At the time a final inspection is requested for 
the building, the dispatcher or the dispatch clerk also 
sends out a request to the fire department, to flood 
control and to zoning to get their approval to make sure 
that all of their requirements have been met. The 
dispatch clerk ihen will receive those back a day or two 
or few days later. And once all of those documents and 
approvals are in the file including the final inspection 
approval, building inspection approval, at that time the 
dispatch clerk determines then that the file is complete 
and it's appropriate to issue a certificate of 
occupancy. 
Q. What, if any, of those procedures would be 
NED A. GREENIG - CAPITOL REPORTERS 
(Examination by Mr. Wells) 44 
taken prior to the issuance of a temporary certificate 
of occupancy? 
A. Probably none of them. 
Q. What does the code require prior to issuance 
of a temporary certificate of occupancy? 
A. May I read again from the code? 
Q. You may. 
A. 307, Paragraph D: If the building official 
finds that no substantial hazard will result from 
occupancy of any building or portion thereof before the 
same is completed, he may issue a temporary certificate 
of occupancy for the use of a portion or portions of a 
building or structure prior to the completion of the 
entire building or structure. 
Q. To your knowledge, would any check be made 
prior to issuance of a temporary certificate of 
occupancy to determine that in fact a building permit 
had been issued? 
A. Ordinarily only to determine if there is a 
building permit number assigned. 
Q. Would they check that number to see what it -• 
A. Not necessarily. 
Q. So it would be possible for a contractor to 
just write a number in and say that's my number and no 
check would be made and a certificate would be issued, 
NED A. GREENIG - CAPITOL REPORTERS 
(Examination by Mr. Wells) 45 
is that correct? 
A. No. There would have to be some documentation 
in our office. We wouldn't even go out on the 
inspection unless we had first at least looked to see if 
there was a file at that address and to take the number 
off the file. So the inspector has the permit number 
before he leaves the office. He does ask others for 
that number. 
Q. So he gets the number from the office files? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And would it be his responsibility then to 
determine that there was a permit prior to going out on 
an inspection? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were there policies and procedures in place 
that were designed to require the inspector to check the 
permit prior to going on an inspection? 
A. Each of the inspectors are instructed to check 
the file before they go out, yes. 
Q. Now, what are they instructed to check for? 
A. They're instructed to check to see if the file 
is complete, and what the most recent inspection was, 
and if there is follow-up work required. 
Q. Now, what types of inspections would be made 
by the county on a building which had only a footings 
NED A. GREENIG - CAPITOL REPORTERS 
(Examination by Mr. Wells) 46 
and foundations permit? 
A. What kind would be made or should be made? 
Q. Should and would. Well, I don't know what the 
difference there is. What inspections are required 
under the code? 
A. Under the footing and foundation permit? 
Q. Let's assume that a contractor has a footings 
and foundations only permit. What inspections under the 
code would be required? 
A. We would perform an inspection prior to 
pouring the footings themselves when the footings are 
ready to receive the concrete. We would perform an 
inspection of the foundation walls above the footing 
when they were ready to receive the concrete. And we 
would perform inspections of any sub-rough plumbing, 
utilities that go underneath the basement floor or the 
ground floor prior to pouring the concrete for thar 
floor. 
Q. What additional inspections are performed 
after the permit for the rest of the building is given? 
A. There would be many on a building like this. 
There would be framing inspections. There would be bond 
beam inspections for the masonry walls. There would be 
electrical, mechanical, plumbing inspections, both rough 
and final and probably multiple of those. As the 
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•1 buildings get larger, we ha v e to come back several times 
2 us 11 a ] 1 i 
3 Q. What's a four-way final ^ - p r ^ ^ r ' 5 
4 A . A f o u r - ¥ a y f I n a 2 i nspect:cr. . where DU -.ding 
5 r e q n i r e m e n t s , m e c h a n i c a 1, e ] e c t: r I, - j 
6 r e q i i :i r e in e i I !;: s a i: e a 1 ] c h e c k e d p i: i c . - . - r * 
7 certi f icate o f occupancy, 
8 Q • Now, wou1d that norma11y fae done prior to the 
9 i s s i i a n c e o i: a t e in p o i a i: ;; > :: e r t i f :i c a t e c • f ::i) c c u p a i i c y : 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Now, yo uf v e t es 11fIe d that t he 1n spe c t o r has 
12 the obligation to verify the permit and the number 
13 b e £ o i: e h e g c • a a c • i 3 !:: :: i i a :i: I i i i s p c= c t :i o n , :i s t: h a t :: o r r a • 
14 A.. Th a t ,: s p a a t o f h i s j o b . 
15 Q. Now, I want yon to assume that you have a 
16 b u 11 d I n g w h e r e t h e o n 1 y p e r m 11 t h a t ! s e v e i: b e e n i s s u e d 
1 7 i s f c: o t: :I i i g s a i i d f o u i I d a 1 1 o i: i s , c i I d } ::) u I i a e a i :n :i n s p e c t o r 
18 t h a t ' s c a 11 e d o n t o c o in, e o u t a i i d c o n d u c t a f o u r - w a y 
19 fin a 1 1 nspe c 11 o n , C a n y o u t e .1 1 in e , g I v en t h o s e t * o 
20 factors wha t shou 1 d happen? 
2 1 A • K e s h o ii 1 d 1 o o k a t t: h e f i 1 e , xa a k e s i i r e 11: i a t t h e 
2 2 p e r HI i t I s c o in, p 1 e t e , a n d i f i t I s n l|! t h e s h o u 1 d n o t :1 f y t h e 
2 3 contra c tor that he f s In vio1a11o n. 
2 4 Q . T o \ c: > i i r k i I o w 3 e d g e , v; e i: e t h e r e p c: 1 i c i e s a n d 
2 5 1 orocedures 11 I D1ace I n the deDar tment whIch reauIred t 
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I n s p e c t o r s t o v e r I f y t h e e x I s t e n c e o f t h <= b u i 1 d i n g 
p e r m :i t p :i : :i c: i : !:: : iii a k I n g a i i ;;i: :i n s j : - e c t i • :i) i i : 
,A "T h e r e w e r e o r a I. p o 1 i c I e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s , y e s • 
Q Were t h e i n s p e c t o r s t r a i n e d I n t h a t r e s p e c t ? 
ft iTe 
Q 1 1 o v d I d t h e y r e c e i l r e t h a t t r a I n I n g ? 
A . In staff m e e t i n g s , s t a f f t rain I n g m eet I n g s . 
Q S o i t w o u 1 d b e a > r j o 1 a t i o n o f t h e d u 11, e s o f 
t h a t i n s p e c t c :i : i f 1 i < s i e i I t: • ::> i :i t a i i d in, a d e a i :i :i i i s ]::: e c t :1 : n < 
a b u i 1 d I n g a n d t h e r e w a s n o t e x t a n t a v a 11 d b u 11 d I n g 
permit? 
h ! :!" s : 
Q I n ) ", I i ! I I I l M i W \! f i b ! " I . I I I I i i I I I i i ! i l M i l l 1 \\ i I 'j i I I f i L 
Inspection was perforuied on th.i s bui 1 dI.ng prior to the 
Issuance o f the temporary certi ficate of occupancy? 
A I b e 3 i e v e t h a t i t v. a s 
2 A n d y o u " v e t e s t i f j e d t h ere w a s n c b i :n i 1 d i n g 
perm,11 whIch a 11 owed the construction to proceed that 
far? 
That ! s coit: rect 
" i "I ?as :I t t h e n a vio 1 at i on of 11 Iu. du t Ii' s ul the 
i nspec t o r to h a v e in a d e t h a t i n s p e c t i o n ? 
/ I wou3 d say yes. 
| "'5 i € i a t h e r: e a n y p o 3 :i c i e s a i I d p i: o c e d u i: e s i n 
place as a back-uo to prevent that tvoe of a 'mistake 
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from occurri ng? 
A . [•!'•• 
Q . Had y o u e v e r I s s 12 e d I n t h e p e r i o d fro m 19 8 3 t o 
1 9 8 6 , di d yo 11 ever 2 ssue any temporary certificates of 
occupancy? 
A . 1J " ii. y y e 1. ij. o n a i 1 y , " l"i <x t I r e c a I I . 
Q . W e r e y o u e v e r g 2 v e ri a 11 y t r a i n i n g 1 n h o w t o d • ::> 
t h a t ? 
A • J11 s t d i s iMi,:«siiM 1c b e t w e e n m y s t- L f ";i 1111 I;«1 N n i J J i 
Q, T e l l me wtiat 1m Lolii you ) ou s h u u M d t - n t h - t 
r e s p e c 1:. 
A. W e d i s c 11 s s e d i t 111 u 11 1 a 11 y t o t r y a n ::I o u t ] ii n e 
w h a t : i 1 g 1 1 !:: t : • D I: e d o 1 1 e
 ; a 1: 1 d b a s :i c a ] ] } ii t: ; ; a s !:: :: • ] : : k t : : -
ma k e s u r e t h a t t h e r e a r e no o b v I o u s 11 f e s a f e t y 
violations, and that at least we are no t aware of any 
substantia 1 p r o b 1 e in s w 11 h t h e b 1 3 i ] d i 1 1 g 
Q . A p p r o x I HI a t e 1 y h o w in 1 1 c h t i in e w o u 1 d, b e 11 1 v o 1 v e :i 
In verifying from the records In your of f ice vhether or 
not a building permit had been Issued? 
A. J u s t: c f e ; in :i n 111 e s 
Q . B y a, f e w , f I v e
 f t e n , t w e n t y ? 
A. Five m i nut e s , 
Q . W h e n y o 11 h a d t h e s e d I s c u s s i o n s w 11 h M r Noble 
a b c i 11 t h € i s s u a n c e : f t e in p o r a i : y c e 1: t i f i c a t e s o f 
ccc u p a n c y , were d I s c u s s i o n s had w 1 1 h respect to 
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v e r i f i c a t :i o i i o f t h e e x j s t e n c e o f f c r e x a :n:i p 3 • = z • ::  i I :i i I g 
c 1 e a r a i I c e
 |( b i i i 1 d I n g p e r in i t s : ' 
A. No W e a re cone ern e d o n1y w11h 1 i f e s a f et y. 
Q. Would i t be fair to say you didi i't care 
w h e t h e r t: h e;;; r h a d c ] : • I :i ::i 3 d :i n g p e r in 3 t a t: 11 I a t ]::: : i n t ; 
A. No We cared but we felt that i t was i f 
such a condi t i on existed , :i t wou 1 d have been discovered 
prior to that. 
Q . . S :: y • :::> i i j "i i s !:: a s s u :i:ii e d y o u \ i <c "i :i 3 • ::I ] : i i D \ ; : ' 
A . . Y e s . . 
Q• W e r e y o u a w a r e of any p r o c e d u r e s o t h e r than 
t h a t t h e i n s p e c t o r s h o u 1 d h a v e c h e c k e d t h a t * o u 3 d c a i i s e 
t: h e a b s e i I c e c > f a ] :) u :i 3 d i i i g p e r :i ci i t t <:» b e d i s c o ;r e r e d p r i c • :i: : 
to issuance of a temporary cei tificate of occupancy? 
• A . N o . 
Q . 13: : i - : • n i ] ;:  i I : \ 1 i < D \ ; i n a i I ;; • i n s p e c t :i <:> n s i: / e i e 
p e r f o r in e d o i i t h i s b u i I d i n g b y c o u n t y i n spec t o r s 
s u b s e q u e n t to f o o t i n g s and f o u n d a t i o n s ? 
A. I don't know how many, I know there was a 
n "i i in b e r o f i i i s p e c t :i o n s p e i: f o r in e d a f t e r t h a t 
Q. Would it be fair to say that on each of thrr~ 
inspections the inspector vio3 ated his duty and 
responsib1 1 i t y b y ::making t h e i n s p e c t i o n ii i the absence 
: f e 1: 'i ii 3 d:i i ig permi t : 
A. Y e s . 
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Q T o y o u r k n o w 1 e d g e \% h a t w a r e t h e I n s p e c t o r s 
!:  c: • 3 d t h e y s h o i :i ] d d o v. :ii t h r e s p e c t t c: > \ ; e r :ii f y i n g p e r m :ii t s 
prIoi: to go11 :ig ou 1: oi i an Inspec11on ? 
i I r e m e m b e r m a n y ti m e s s a y I n g to the :i n s p e c t o r s 
1 o o k a t y o u r f :i 1 e b e f o r e y o \ i g o o u t. M a k e s u r e i t"' s 
:: c in p 3 e 1: e T1 i c t ' ' s t h c= k :i i I d • :: f i i i s t :i : i i :: t i - : i I t h a !:: t: 1 i e y 
r e c e I v e d o i I a r e g u 1 a i b a s i s . 
Q Now, were they gIven an explanatIon of what a 
c o m p 3 e t e f 13 e o u g h t 1: o c o n t, a I n ? 
1 Y e s S p e c i f I c a 3 3 } w c= in e i i t i o i I e d in a k s s i i :i : • 3 t h a t: 
i t ! s n o t j ii s t a f o o 11 n g a n d f o u n d a 11 on pa r m 11: I »« :: • :> k f o r 
a £u3 3 permit. 
Q I) o ;\ o i i r e c a 3 3 w h e t h e r t h a t t r a i n :i n g a n d t h o s e t 
I n s t r u c 11, o n s w e r e g I v e n t o t h e :i n s p e c t o r s p r i ::> r t o 
I) e c e xn b e r o f 19 8 5? 
i i Y e s , 
Q W a • :i !:: y o i I :: : u n d e r s t a i i d 11 I g t h a i: t h o s e 
i n s t r u c z i o n s w e r e i i i p 1 a c e f r o in t. h e t: I m e y c u w e r e 
e m p 1 o y e d o n w a r d ? 
Y e s 
f i ? i o \ ; , j 1 i s I: a s a i: c :i n t :: • i: :: 3 a i: :ii f I c a t i :: :i: :t
 t i „ s I 
ii n d e r s t a n d i t, y o u r d e p a r t m e n t' s m a j o r v r 111 e n , I g u e s s 
we shou1d say, p r o c e d u r e s or w h a t e v e r w e r e to f o i l o w the 
code ? 
A. . .-? s . 
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Q . A n d I f t h e c o d e s a I d s o :m e t h I n g s h o "i i II d t € d o n • 2 
y o n i: I ri s t r u c 1 1 o n s t c 11 I e p < =i o p 3 e I n t h e d e p a r t: in e n t w e r e 
t h a t ' s t h e w a y i t s h o u 1 d b e d o n e ? 
A. T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . 
Q. :' 'i :t I t he bi ii ] d i INM.J t mln i lnos r e q u i n i \n i in i J 
p r .. .... n s t r u e 1 1 o n ? 
A. Y e s . 
Q . A n d y o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s t h a t i t u; o u 1 d b e 
\ i o 3 a 11 :::> i :i • ::: • f !::: h e : :: > d c= t : i: c i I s 1 i a c t a i: • "i i ::i 1 d I i :i g s i i :: 1 I a = • 
t h e o n e w e :| r e I n w 111 I a f o o 111 i g s a n d f o u n d a t i o n s o n 1 y 
p e r m i t ? 
A. T h a t ! s c o r r e c t . 
Q • A i i d t h a t i s a s i t: u a t: I o i i w 1 :i :i c 1: i s i i o u 1 « 
b e e n d I s c o v e r e d by y o u r I n s p e c t o r s o:n e a c i :i and e v e r y 
I n s p e c t i o n o t h e r t h a n a f o o t i n g s a n d f o u n d a t i o n s 
i n s p e c t i o n ? 
A. Y e s . 
Q . A n d p a r 1 1 c u 1 a r 2 y o n a f I n a 1 f o u r - w a y ? 
A. Y e s . 
Q • W • :: i i ] ::i :i t 1 : = f a :i :i : t o s 1: a 1: e t h a t y o u r 
understanding of the code i s that a temporary 
cer11ficate of occupancy shou ] d not be Issued absent a 
^diiaing permit? 
A. i e s . 
Q, And if it were so issued it would be subject 
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to being revoked pursuant to the code? 
A. 
Q. 
error? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
And if it were so issued, it would be an 
v. 
It would be unauthorized by law? 
MR. THURGOOD: I object. I think you're 
asking 10; .- .0:3a! conclusion. 
THE WITNESS: I don't think I can answer that 
Q. It would be a violation of the code, as you 
understand it? 
The building official hasn't violated the 
code. He has issued a certificate in error and the 
certificate would have no validity. But the actual 
procedure of issuing the temporary certificate in error 
is not in itself a violation of the code. 
Q. It's not a violation of the code as such? 
A. That ' s right. 
Q. It's merely a violation of the tenets of the 
code? 
A. It's a violation of procedures. It's a 
violation by the builder to have built without the 
permit, but the most that can be said for the 
certificate.1 i. Lseif is simply that it's invalid. 
Q. And if the builder were to ask you to issue 
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s i i c 1 i e ,. ::  • e i: !:: :i f ::i c a t e , I: i = " d b e a s ] :: 11 i g b a s i c a .1 ] j :!:: o i: a i I 
I n v a 11 d c e r 11 £ i c a t e ? 
,.?:! T h a t ! s c o r r e c t . 
Q ft n d t h e b u :i 3 d e r c e r t a :i n 3 ;;:r s h o i :i 3 d J : i :i : \ \ v. 
1 i e 1 i a • I a p e r in I t o i: i I c t ? 
P. Y e s • T h a t l s a n o t h e r a s s u m p 1 1 o n t h a t t h e 
b u i 1 d I n g d e p a r t m e n t f r e q u e n 1 1 y in a k e s . 
Q D o e 3 !:: 1 I Ei c o i i n t y in a k e e f f o i: t s t o s a f e g u a j d t: h «• • 
f 11 e s t h a t I t: in a I n t a I n s ? 
& Y e s N o t a 1 w a y s s u c c e s s f u 1 b u t , y e s 
Q S o i t ! s p o s s i b l e t h a t some t h :i n ij in 3 g 1 i t 1: e 3 o s 1 
ft £ e s 
Q But if something were lost, you would not knc -
vhat it was obviously? 
1 ; Til a t:! s corr ect. 
Q N o w
 f y ° u ' v e ind.i c a t ed t h a t y o u k e e r a ^ ^ ^ A o r 
soxnething o f that nature on each b u i 1 d i n g ? 
A We keep a £i le, 
A n d t e 11 in e w 1 i a t a t ;r p i c a 3 £ :i 3 e "u, o i :i 3 • ::i i i c r in a 3 3 \ i: : 
conta 
A 
f o 1 d e r 
The file would contai n -- it,! s in a mani la 
1 1 w o u 1 d h a v e i n s j d e t h e b u i 1 d i n g p e r in i t 1 1 
i c • i 1 3 • ::! 1 i a v e : o ]:: i e s c: f a 3 3 i i i s p e • :: t i o i i s , i n s p e c t i o n r e p o r 
£orms for inspections that had been performed on that 
bui1dina. 11 wou1d have cooies of all inspection 
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requests that have come in by telephone filled out on a 
little card or paper. And it would also contain any 
fire, flood or zoning approvals that may have come 
through or requests for such that may have gone out. It 
may also contain letters, correspondence related to that 
file, memorandums occasionally. Those are relatively 
rare. 
Q. Would it be fair to say then that anything 
relating to that property would go in that file? 
A. As far as the building permit is concerned, 
yes. 
Q. Now, do you with respect to that file have 
anything similar to a docket card which would list the 
items that should be in the file that have been 
received? 
A. We didnft at that time. There was a little 
stamp that we put on the front that just was fire, 
flood and zoning where it could be checked off at that 
time. We've modified that procedure since. 
Q. Was there anything checked on there that would 
show the date the permit was issued, anything of that 
nature? 
A. On the outside of the file? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes, on the label. A label is typed that 
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gives the address of the property, the building permit 
number, the date that it was issued, and the name of the 
applicant, and sometimes the description, brief 
description of the work. 
Q. And that would be the label for the file? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, when you say it gives the number, I 
believe you previously testified that the procedure 
would be if a footing and foundation only was issued, 
that that would get a number, and then at the point in 
time where the full permit was issued it would get a new 
number? 
A. At that time, yes. 
Q. Would that then be on a label and go on the 
file? 
Yes A. 
Q. And so the procedure would be that upon 
issuance of the full permit a new label would be made 
and put on the file? 
A. Usually an additional label. 
Q. So the original would be there and then the 
second one would be there? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So it would be relatively easy for someone 
checkina the file to determine whether or not a full 
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permit had been issued? 
A. Yes, except the second label was usually 
hidden by the folder coming up to it so you only saw the 
top one. 
Q. But it's just a matter of looking and then you 
can see that number? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did the first label denote that it was 
footings and foundations only? 
A. I'm not sure. Ordinarily it would. 
Q. Do you know in this case whether it did? 
A. I'm not sure. 
Q. While you're checking these records, could you 
check that for us and determine? 
A. I have every reason to believe that it did. 
Q. All right. That's something I would like you 
to verify for me, if you could. 
MS. MARLOWE: Can you? 
I will check the records. 
Can you find it? 
THE WITNESS: I think I can. 
MS. MARLOWE: Well, assuming they're there. 
Q. So that I understand, the normal practice 
would be to put footings and foundations only and then 
aive it a number? 
THE WITNESS: 
MS. MARLOWE: 
NED A. GREENIG - CAPITOL REPORTERS 
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A. That's correct. 
Q. Would it be fair to say that that was the 
procedure? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And, to your knowledge, that procedure was 
followed in this case? 
A. Yes. 
Q. As far as you know? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have any reason to believe that 
procedures with respect to labeling the file and giving 
numbers were not followed in this case? 
A. No. 
MS. MARLOWE: Could we take a break for a 
minute. 
MR. WELLS: Sure. 
(Short recess.) 
Q. Tell me how inspections are generated. 
A. The builder proceeds with his work until he is 
ready to cover that particular aspect of the work. He 
then calls in to our office and requests the inspection 
and gives the address, the permit number, and the kind 
of inspection and the date that he'd like to have that 
inspection, usually the next day. Then the file is 
pulled and put in the inspector's tub, if you will, and 
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he comes in the next morning and finds his list or his 
group of inspections to be done that day. 
Q. Now, you indicated something about a little 
card being made out. Is that something that --
form? 
A little slip of paper, an inspection request 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, is that a form that would stay in the 
file? 
A. Ordinarily, yes. 
Q. So I guess whoever answers the phone would 
fill out that little slip? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Then go pull the file, attach the slip to the 
file and put it in the inspector's box, is that correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So the inspector then prior to going out on 
the inspection would have the file? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And at that time, having the file in his 
hands, how much of an effort would it be to verify that 
a permit in fact was issued? 
A. Not very difficult. 
Q. In fact, he could check the number right there 
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on the file? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And, to your knowledge, were the inspectors 
trained to in fact verify the number on the slip with 
the number on the file? 
A. Yes. They had received that instruction 
repeatedly. 
Q. And so it would be a violation of their 
instructions and duties if they did not make that check? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I want you to assume that just a footings and 
foundations permit had been issued on a particular job, 
and that the policy of the office had been followed, and 
that the label on the file showed footings and 
foundations only number whatever. And that an inspector 
received — let's say he received a call to come out and 
inspect masonry work. And on the little slip that he 
got there was a number and he looked at the number, 
looked at the file and saw footings and foundations only 
number 12345, and on the inspection request the permit 
number was 12345, at that point in time what duties and 
obligations would the inspector have with respect to the 
policies and procedures he should follow? 
A. His duty at that point probably would be to go 
to the job site and notify the contractor that he was in 
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violation, that the inspection would not be performed 
until he had corrected his paperwork problems, 
permitting problems. 
Q. When you say probably, explain what you mean 
by that. 
A. Well, another alternative would be to simply 
call the builder on the telephone and talk to him on the 
phone. Ordinarily he would probably go to the job site. 
Q. So what you're telling me is that his 
obligation would be to contact the builder and make sure 
that the permitting problem were resolved? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the problem relates to how he does that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. But that would be his obligation, his duty, 
what he's trained to do? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And were he to fail ro do that, would ihai be 
a violation of his duties and obligations? 
A. Yes. It would result probably in a lower 
valuation if we discovered it. 
Q. Would it be a violation of his duties to come 
out and perform the inspection without saying anything 
to the contractor about the permitting problem? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Would it be a violation of his duties not to 
discover the permitting problem? 
A. Probably. He!d have to at least look, and 
there may be cases in some files where itfs not so 
obvious. For instance, there may have been other papers 
stapled over the building permit. He didn't go through 
all the papers and get down and discover that it was 
footings and foundations. He's obligated to at least 
open the file and take a few seconds or minute or so to 
check the file and see that it is current and 
up-to-date. There's still a possibility that he would 
miss it. And his first obligation is to look at the 
file and see that it's complete. If he misses it after 
having made a cursory review, that's not necessarily a 
violation. 
Q. Were the files constructed in such a manner as 
to cover up the label? 
A. Only the way I described it to you with the 
folder closed. But once they open the folder they don't 
usually look at the label. They only look at the label 
when the folder is closed, then they open it up to look 
at the contents. 
Q. How would they verify that the number on the 
little slip was the same number as the file? 
A. That's really not part of their 
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responsibility. 
Q. Whose responsibility is that? 
A. That's the dispatch clerk. 
Q. Has the dispatch clerk been trained to make 
that verification? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And has the dispatch clerk been trained to 
know the difference between a full permit and a footings 
and foundations only permit? 
A. They would know the difference, yes. 
Q. And should they receive a request for an 
inspection other than footings and foundations, using a 
footings and foundations only number, were they trained 
to bring that to someone's attention? 
A. That was not part of their duty. Only if they 
became aware of the problem, but it was not — because 
the files are usually pulled sometime after the 
inspection request is received, all they!re looking for 
is to verify the address and the permit number. They're 
not looking at the type of inspection or the type of 
permit or anything like that. 
Q. Whose duty and obligation was it to determine 
that the inspection was being made on a validly issued 
permit? 
A. The contractor. 
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1 I Q. The county had no such duty? 
2 | A. Only as a courtesy. 
3 | Q. So you would come out and make an inspection 
4 | even if they didn't have a permit as long as they gave 
5 | you some kind of a number? 
6 | A. As long as they gave us a number for which we 
7 I could find a file in our files. 
8 ] Q. And even if the number were for the wrong 
9 kind of a permit, your people had no duty to make that 
10 verification? 
11 A. They had a duty only insofar as their 
12 performance evaluations might be affected by their 
13 continuing failure to pick up on that kind of a 
14 problem. The first duty lies with the contractor to 
15 call in a valid permit number and request appropriate 
16 inspections. 
17 Q. I understand that. But if the contractor was 
18 determined that he was going to build rhe building 
19 without a permit, are you telling me that your 
20 department had no policies or procedures in place that 
21 would prevent that from happening? 
22 I A. The policies and procedures that we have would 
23 I prevent final occupancy of that building from being 
24 I allowed. 
25 I Q. But they wouldn't prevent a temporary 
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certificate? 
A. It's set up so that if we discover that 
problem we act on it. 
Q. I understand that. What I want to know is 
what policies and procedures were in place that would 
cause you to make that discovery? 
A. Only the instruction that they should look at 
the file, and if they discover that it's not correct, 
that they should not make the inspection. 
Q. And I think that's back to where we got 
started before you gave me the probably. Are you 
telling me then that the inspector has the duty and 
obligation to determine that there's a permit? 
A. He has the duty and obligation to determine --
to review the file for completeness. 
Q. And that would include determining whether 
there's a permit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. And so if he doesn't make that 
determination, then it's a violation of his duty? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, let's talk about a document called a stop 
work order. Tell me what those are and who issues them. 
A. Stop work order is an order specified in the 
building code that allows the building official or his 
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authorized representative to notify a contractor that he 
is to stop work on the structure for some violation of 
the building code. 
Q. And who issues those? 
A. The building official or his authorized 
representative. 
Q. And once a stop work order is issued, what 
policies and procedures did your department have in 1983 
to 1986 to enforce the stop work order? 
A. In other words, to make sure that the builder 
does not continue to work? 
Q. Yes. And continue to get inspections and 
continue to -- those kinds of things. 
A. First of all, the stop work order -- a stop 
work order would be stamped or written on the front of 
the file usually in large letters. 
Q. So anybody could see it? 
A. Yes, as soon as they picked up the file. 
Q. That's what should happen? 
A. Yes. 
Q. If it did not happen, would that be a 
violation of procedures? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Go ahead. 
A. As far as the builder himself continuing work, 
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we don't usually use any kind of force unless there is 
an apparent life safety violation at which time we would 
probably bring in a sheriff to obtain compliance with 
that work order if he didn't voluntarily stop upon our 
notice. 
Q. Now, when you say a life safety — 
A. In other words, if they are creating a hazard 
by the structure that they!re building that may present 
danger to the life of the public, for instance, walking 
by on the sidewalk, construction is going to fall on 
them, then we have to take some summary kind of action. 
But ordinarily we give them the notice, and if they don't 
voluntarily comply we ordinarily go through some kind of 
a legal procedure, take them to court or something, 
rather than summary action. 
Q. What steps are normally taken by your office 
or what procedures are in place for the determination of 
whether or not the order is being complied with? 
A. Usually just on-site visits or observations by 
the field inspector. 
Q. Do you know whether at any time a stop work 
order was issued with respect to the building at 4252 
South 700 East? 
A. Ifm not sure. 
Q. Does your department maintain records of those 
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orders? 
A. It would be in conjunction with that file. 
Yes, there would be a record of it in that file for this 
building. 
Q. But you don't know whether one was ever issued 
on this building or enforced or --
A. I'm not sure. I seem to recall having seen 
that stamp on the front of the file but I'm not sure. 
Q. That's an area where we need some testimony. 
I don't know whether we're going to need to continue him 
or whether we can get it from Ray when he comes. 
A. Ray should be able to provide that 
information. 
MR. WELLS: I will not insist then that this 
deposition be continued to produce that information on 
your representation that Mr. Noble will provide it. 
MS. MARLOWE: On his representation. 
Q. On your representation, and if Mr. Noble does 
not, then we will have to continue this deposition. Is 
that understood? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's agreeable? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. Let's assume that a stop work 
order has been issued and there is such a stamo on the 
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front of a file. Would it be a violation of the 
procedures and policies of your office for an inspector 
to go out and make a subsequent inspection on the work 
on a building prior to the lifting of that stop work 
order? 
A. Yes, except to determine compliance with the 
stop work 
Q. 
order, of course. 
I understand. But if, for example, they 
received an electrical inspection or a plumbing 
inspection or --
A. 
Q. 
violation 
A. 
Q. 
They couldn't give any approvals on such work. 
All right. And if they did, that would be a i 
of procedures? 
Yes. 
Would it be a violation of procedures for them 
to make inspections for subcontractors while that stop 
work order was in effect? 
A. 
Q. 
plumbing, 
A. 
Q. 
does that 
premises? 
A. 
Yes. j 
That would include mechanical, electrical, 
any type of work at all? 
Yes. 
Tell us with respect to the stop work order, 
stop every type of work of any type on the 
Ordinarily it does unless it specifically is 
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restricted to one area. For instance, sometimes at the 
discretion of the building official, he may say the 
electrical work is stopped on this because you're not 
complying. You can go ahead with the plumbing or 
something like that. That's a rare occurrence but it 
does occasionally happen. 
Q. But if it were other than a total stop work, 
that would be so noted? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if there were no such notation, then the 
stop work order would be for the complete project? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And any work carried on prior to the lifting 
of that srop work order would be a violation of the 
provisions of the building code? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would it be a violation of the provisions of a 
building code to do work on the building without a 
permit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Any type of work? 
A. No. There's some work that could be permitted 
on the property. Putting up a fence, paving the ground, 
putting in a utility, for instance, the power or 
something like that. 
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1 | Q. What about painting? 
2 | A. Painting is generally not regulated by the 
3 I code. 
4 | Q. So types of work that may not be regulated 
5 | you're saying could go on without a permit even though 
6 | the building itself had been built in violation of not 
7 I having a permit? 
8 A. That's a very difficult question. 
9 Q. What I!m trying to get at is if it's a 
10 violation of the code to put the wall up, is it also a 
11 violation to paint the wall? 
12 A. I would say it probably would be. That's a 
13 question I haven't been asked. I really hadn't thought 
14 about that before, but I think it probably would be a 
15 violation, the intent being that before they continue 
16 any further with the work we have to find out if what 
17 they're doing is legal. Maybe they'll have to tear it 
18 down, and we don't want them putting more on -char 
19 they'll have to tear down. 
20 Q. So if they had footings and foundations only, 
21 any work on the rest of the building would be in 
22 violation? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Now, is it your understanding that the county 
25 has adopted an ordinance incorooratina the 1982 buildina 
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1 code? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Is the 1982 code the code that was in place 
4 during 1984 and 1985? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. To your knowledge, does the county ordinance 
7 make it a crime to violate the building code? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Did you have anything to do with the temporary 
10 occupancy certificate that was issued on this building? 
11 A. I did not. 
12 Q. As far as you know, this particular building, 
13 4252 South 700 East, is the only instance that you're 
14 aware of in the history of Salt Lake County where a 
15 temporary certificate of occupancy has been issued 
16 without there previously having been a valid building 
17 permit? 
18 j A. For the enrire building, that's correct. 
19 Q. Do you know what inspections were performed on 
20 the building by the county, this building? 
21 A. I don't have a personal knowledge of it. Just 
22 the records that are available to me. We perform about 
23 ten to 20,000 inspections a year. 
24 Q. I understand. I!m just wondering if you were 
25 aware of the fact that inspections other than footings 
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and foundations had been carried out on this building by 
county inspectors? 
A. I am aware of that fact, yes. 
Q. Do you know how many of those there were? 
A. No. I would say probably a dozen. 
Q. As to the performance of each of those 
inspections, there was no building permit allowing the 
work that was being inspected? 
A. That's apparently correct, yes. 
At least to the knowledge you have, that's Q. 
correct? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
At least as a representative of the county, 
you're admitting that there was no building permit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that those inspections were performed at 
a time when there was no building permit other than 
footings and foundations? 
A. Any inspections performed after the footings 
and foundations, and I believe there were several, were 
done without the proper permits. 
Q. All right. And assuming that there was in 
existence a stop work order at the time any of those 
inspections were performed, would it also be a violation 
to have performed those inspections given a stop work 
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order? 
A. Yes. A violation of procedures. 
Q. Would it also be a violation of the code? 
A. No. 
Q. Is it a violation of the code to perform the 
inspections without the existence of a building permit? 
A. No. 
Q. But it is a violation of procedures? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is it a violation of procedure to issue — or 
was it a violation of procedure to issue a temporary 
certificate of occupancy without there being a valid 
building permit for other than footings and foundations? 
A. I think it probably would have to be 
considered a violation of procedure. 
Q. Do the employees of your department have 
discretion to ignore the procedures of the department? 
A. There is some discretion allowed, but it would 
have to be very exceptional circumstances. The 
procedures are not intended to address every possible 
circumstance that might arise, and if there is a 
circumstance where applying our usual procedures would 
not achieve the intent of the code, that is, protection 
of life safety and public health and welfare and so on, 
there is a certain amount of discretion on the part of 
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1 | the inspector to deviate from procedures. 
2 I Q. Does the inspector have discretion to waive 
3 | code requirements? 
4 | A. No. 
5 | Q. And when I say inspector, I mean any employee 
6 | of your department up to and including yourself or Mr. 
7 | Noble. 
8 | A. I understand that. 
9 I Q. And maybe I should just use employees. Would 
10 employees of your department have discretion to waive 
11 the existence of a building permit in performing an 
12 inspection? 
13 A. No. 
14 Q. Would employees of your department have 
15 discretion to waive the existence of a building permit 
16 in issuing a temporary certificate of occupancy? 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. Would employees of your department have 
19 discretion to waive a stop work order and allow 
20 construction to proceed? 
21 A. Not without having satisfied themselves that 
22 J the conditions of the stop work order had been met. 
23 | They may be able to lift it themselves. 
24 | Q. I understand that. But without actually 
25 | lifting it, and letfs assume that the stop work order 
NED A. GREENIG - CAPITOL REPORTERS 
(Examination by Mr. Wells) 76 
remains in effect, do employees have discretion to allow 
work to continue while that stop work order is in 
effect? 
A. I can't think of a circumstance that would 
allow that. 
Q. Would your employees -- or would the employees 
of the department have discretion to go ahead and 
inspect and approve work while a stop work order was in 
effect? 
A. Ordinarily, no. I can't think of 
circumstances that would allow that. 
Q. Would it be fair to say, then, that these 
requirements such as not allowing work to proceed while 
there's a stop work order, not allowing work to proceed 
without a building permit, are mandatory requirements 
that cannot be waived at the discretion of the employee? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so there would be norhing discretionary 
about that? 
A. No. 
Q. It wouldn't call on someone to interpret a 
procedure? 
A. No. 
Q. In 1986, I believe you said it was January, is 
when the department was reorganized? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And at that time the present organizational 
structure came into effect? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Which makes you Ray Noble's supervisor? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I believe you testified earlier that Mr. Noble 
had discretion to run his department, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. To what extent since January of 1986 have you 
supervised, if at all, the day-to-day activities of, and 
I forget what we call it now that it's changed to the 
department? 
A. Inspection services. 
Q. Inspection services, is that the department 
that Ray Noble is head of? 
A. No. He's building inspection. 
Q. And I understand that's a subdivision of your 
department? 
A. Of my section, yes. 
Q. I want you to tell us the extent of 
supervision that you give to Mr. Noble in running his 
department or whatever it's denominated. 
A. I supervise him fairly closely, requiring him 
to at least show how he is accomplishing certain 
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objectives, not necessarily telling him how to do it. 
Sometimes telling him how to do it. 
Q. With respect to the day-to-day operation of 
his department, does he have discretion to run that 
pretty much the way he wants? 
A. Answerable to me, yes. 
Q. With respect to decisions to issue or not 
issue building permits, to issue or not issue 
certificates of occupancy, stop work orders, temporary 
certificates of occupancy, to what extent, if any, would 
you be involved in those decisions? 
A. I don't interfere with him. I make many of 
those decisions in his absence since he's in the field 
most of the time. But if there's any question about 
whether or not a permit should be issued or whether or 
nor an inspection should be performed, he has the final 
say in that. I don't interfere with him in that. 
Q. Did there come a rime when you became aware 
that there were problems with this property at 4252 
South 700 East? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When did that occur? 
A. It was a short time subsequent to the issuance 
of the temporary certificate of occupancy, probably a 
couole of months later. 
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Q. Who brought the problem to your attention? 
A. I don't recall. I believe it was Ray Noble. 
Q. Do you recall what was said at that occasion? 
A. I don't. 
Q. Did whoever talk to you tell you what the 
problems were? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. What did you perceive at that point the 
problem to be? 
A. As I recall — and let me preface this. I get 
many problem situations that come up, and until they 
have evolved to a certain point, I don't really keep 
track of it in my mind too well until it reaches a point 
where it becomes a major issue. There are a lot of 
minor problems that come up, and this one I think I 
probably regarded that way until it started to unfold. 
Q. At what point in time did you perceive the 
problem with this property to be a major problem? 
A. Probably in late summer subsequent to the 
temporary certificate of occupancy. That would have 
been I guess about August of 1986, if my dates are 
correct. 
Q. And at that point in time what did you 
perceive the problem to be? 
A. A building being illegally occupied without 
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proper permits or certificates of occupancy. 
Q. Now, when you say being illegally occupied — 
A. Occupied without a valid certificate of 
occupancy and having a number of problems that needed to 
be rectified before such certificate of occupancy could 
be issued. 
Q. Were you aware at that time that no building 
permit other than footings and foundations had been 
issued? 
A. I believe I was aware of it at that time. 
Q. Were you aware at that time that a stop work 
order had been issued? 
A. I don't recall whether or not one had ever 
been issued. I don't have a clear recollection of that. 
Q. You were aware -- well, why don't you tell me, 
to the best of your recollection, those things that you 
were aware of with respect to the property at that point 
in rime. 
A. I think that what really brought it to my 
attention as a significant problem was the submittal to 
the county of a report on this building prepared by some 
design professionals, an architect and some engineers 
who had reviewed the building and determined that there 
were numerous structural and other code problems with 
it. At that point in time I felt this was an out of the 
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ordinary problem, and I started to put things into the 
memory banks, still not entirely clear with exactly the 
order or the dates involved. It must have been around 
August or so of 1986 that we received those reports. 
Q. Now, you have indicated that this was summer 
sometime, July, August? 
A. Late summer. Maybe even as far into as early 
fall. Maybe as far as September, in other words. 
Q. Were you aware that prior to that time Mr. 
Noble had been having problems with the property? 
A. I'm sure I was aware that there were some 
problems with it, but it wasn't significant enough for 
me to get closely involved with it. 
Q. So whatever Mr. Noble may have done prior to 
July or August of September, you were not aware of? 
A. I was not involved with it enough to even form 
a memory on it. 
Q. With respect to decisions such as requiring a 
party to vacate a building, are those the types of 
decisions that normally would be made by Mr. Noble alone 
or would he consult you on those? 
A. He would normally do that alone. He may ask 
for my opinion on it. I say normally, it's a very rare 
occurrence so we don't have a — 
Q. Was there a policy or procedure in place with 
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respect to who ought to make that decision and under 
what circumstances? 
A. I don't think there was ever a question that 
the decision should be made by the building official. 
The circumstances would -- there had never been criteria 
outlined specifically for that, no, other than what's in 
the building code, 
Q. Prior to 1986 are you aware of Salt Lake 
County ever evicting an occupant from a building? 
A. I'm not aware of any such circumstances having 
occurred before. 
Q. Even up to the present time, are you aware of 
any other situation where Salt Lake County has ever 
evicted an occupier of a building after having issued a 
temporary certificate and prior to the final being 
issued? 
A. No. 
Q. To your knowledge, were there ever any 
policies or procedures or discussions, oral procedures, 
anything, with respect to the criteria that would be 
relied upon in causing someone to be evicted from a 
building? 
A. Yes. If I can take just a minute to kind of 
explain that. There are oral policies in place that 
indicate that we don't take any kind of summary action, 
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as I mentioned before, unless there is real danger of 
life, health or property that would result from our 
failure to vacate a building or -co carry out some kind 
of summary action. We will typically, even when we 
find, for instance, that someone is building over a stop 
work order or building without a permit or occupying 
without a certificate of occupancy, all which are 
violations of the building code, we will typically not 
take summary action to take that person to court or to 
vacate or anything like that unless we feel that there 
is a real serious life safety problem. Under the 
building code, as we understand it, we actually would 
have the authority as soon as we discover that situation 
to immediately go out and vacate a building, but we have 
just made it a policy or a procedure, an oral procedure, 
if you will, that we won't do that unless it just gets 
so serious and so dangerous that there needs to be some 
more summary action taken. 
Q. So it would be an extreme situation to cause 
someone to vacate? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when you say the situation gets extreme, 
that would mean that there was imminent danger to life 
or limb? 
A. There is evidence that there is imminent 
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danger to life or limb. 
Q. And so then you would cause them to vacate and 
wouldn't let them back in I guess until that danger had 
been resolved? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Would it be the normal practice to allow the 
building occupier to make the repairs while they were 
still occupying the building assuming there was not some 
imminent life threatening danger? 
A. Yes. Understand that the occupant of the 
building would need to follow appropriate state laws, 
getting permits and getting licensed contractors and so 
on where it's appropriate. 
Q. I understand. But assuming that efforts were 
being made to cause those things to be done, you would 
not normally just kick them out until it was done? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. And it would rake some type of an event to 
cause them to actually vacate? In other words, you have 
to discover something that's life threatening or --
A. Yes, that's correct. 
Q. And would it be fair to say that -- let's 
assume a situation where like we had here where you've 
got somebody occupying a building, the temporary 
certificate has expired, and a determination has been 
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made that certain items have to be completed before a 
permanent certificate will be issued. And let's assume 
that on the list of items to be completed there is 
nothing that relates to a life threatening type of a 
situation. As I understand it, your procedure would be 
to allow them to remain in the building and complete 
those items and then the final certificate would be 
issued? 
A. That would ordinarily be the procedure that 
we'd follow. 
Q. And letfs assume that that procedure were 
being followed. Would it be fair to say then that no 
notice to vacate then would issue under the standard 
procedure unless it were discovered in the interim that 
there was some life threatening, imminent life 
threatening, situation in the building? 
A. Thar!s correct. 
Q. Would the county normally come our and make 
the inspections on the building to determine what needed 
to be done to comply with the code? 
A. It depends on the particular situation. In 
this case we wouldn't have come out to make further 
inspections until the proper permits and approvals were 
in place. 
Q. And so, if I understand it correctly, at least 
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carry out those responsibilities? 
A. I became the building official with regard to 
this building. 
Q. And have been since that date? 
A. No. When he was subsequently — I understand 
that he was released or that he is no longer personally 
being sued, and at that point in time when his personal 
involvement ended he resumed his involvement as building 
official on this building. 
(Exhibit 4 was marked.) 
Q. Ifm handing you what's been marked as Exhibit 
4 which purports to be page 1 of Exhibit 2 without the 
return receipt showing thereon. Do you recognize that 
as having been part of that document? 
A. Yes. Appears to be the same document. 
Q. Without the return receipt showing? 
A. Yes. It appears to be the same. I believe I 
have seen this document before. 
Q. Now, calling your attention to a document 
attached as the last three pages of Exhibit 3, I ask you 
to take a look at this document which purports to be a 
copy of a letter written by Mr. Noble. I111 ask have 
you ever seen that letter before? 
A. If I've seen it before, it was cursory. I 
didn't go through it in detail, and I probably have seen 
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it. 
Q. Do you recall whether at the time that letter 
was written you were involved with Mr. Noble in the 
purported problems of this building? 
A. I don't believe I was. 
Q. I would like you to look at the items listed 
on that letter and tell me, in your opinion, which of 
those items, if any, would cause imminent danger to life 
or limb. 
A. There are a couple of these that may present a 
danger but not necessarily imminent danger. The stair-
ways not arranged or finished on the west side of the 
building on the second floor. Lateral bracing, those 
are problems that could present a structural or physical 
danger but probably not imminent. At least if it was 
imminent, I think it would have been emphasized more, 
take it down, on the stairs, for instance, take it down. 
Q. Those two thar you've mentioned, are they the 
types of items that you would normally expect could be 
repaired during continued occupancy? 
A. Probably, yes, in most cases. 
Q. Are there any other items in there that you 
believe are life threatening or potentially so? 
A. Not imminent life threatening. 
Q. I believe you said that you normally would not 
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require a building to be vacated unless it was 
imminently life threatening? 
A. That's correct. May I add one thing to that. 
That is that if over a period of time there's no 
apparent effort to correct the situation, you know, if 
the person isn't diligently trying to correct the 
deficiencies, at some point in time we'd have to say if 
you're not going to fix it you'll have to get out. But 
we'll generally let that go for quite a while. 
Q. Then normally you'd tell them that, say, look, 
this is getting too far down the road, and if it isn't 
fixed by a certain date we're going to have to have you 
get out? 
A. Yes, that's correct. 
MR. WELLS: We've got five to 12:00. Do you 
want to break and do lunch and then bring those back? 
MS. MARLOWE: That's fine. 
MR. WELLS: Let's shoot for 1:30. 
(Noon recess.) 
•k * * 
April 23, 1990 2:00 p.m. 
(Exhibits 5 and 6 marked.) 
Q. I'll hand you what has been marked as Exhibit 
5 which you previously identified and which does not 
have superimposed thereon the return receipt for the 
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Q. In reaching a net figure for the cost of the move 
and of renting the alternate space, did you deduct that amount 
from the total? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What is the net amount of the loss resulting from 
the two moves and the renting of the alternate space? 
A. The net amount is $351,604.20. 
Q. Have you prepared an Exhibit 245 that shows that 
breakdown? 
A. Yes, I have. 
MR. WELLS: We would move the admission of 245. 
Do you have an objection to 243? 
MR. DEL BARTEL: No. 
MR. WELLS: May we have 243 admitted, your Honor? 
THE COURT: The exhibit is received. 
MR. WELLS: That's all we have, subject to the 
admission of the two exhibits. 
THE COURT: Cross-examination? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. DEL BARTEL: 
Q. Exhibit 243 shows there are payments made to Frank 
Klenk, Brad Klenk, and Earl Nay. Were those people movers? 
A. They by trade are not. But we had some book shelves 
that they had made, and those were needed to be taken apart, 
and they moved them over to the building. 
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1 Q. What was t h a t amount? 
2 A, $37,268. 
3 Q, Would you put that in. 
4 A. (The witness complies.) 
5 Q. And you have a miscellaneous category. What amount 
6 did you put into your bid for miscellaneous items? 
7 A. $11,816. 
8 Q. Would you put that in, please. 
9 A. (The witness complies.) 
10 Q. And that gives us a total cost of — 
11 A. $333,515. 
12 Q. Did you represent to Mr. Debry that you would 
13 contract with him to bring the building to code and get a 
14 certificate of occupancy for that amount? 
15 A. Yes, I did. 
16 Q. Mr. Karren, would you describe to the jury what 
17 repairs your bid would include with respect to the masonry 
18 portion of the bid, and why you included each item in that 
19 bid, 
20 A. The masonry, the following items would be fixed: 
21 The placement of steel reinforcement, grouting, ledger bolts, 
22 ledgers, diaphragm strap anchors. That would be — the 
23 masonry would be brought up to code so it could take 
24 earthquake forces. 
25 Q. Is that a difficult process? 
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